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In December 1984, Stanley Watras, a resident of Boyertown,
Pennsylvania, and employee of the Limerick Nuclear Power Plant, set off
radiation detection devices as he arrived for work one morning.'
Investigators, unable to find the source of the radiation, eventually
discovered traces of radioactive radon on Watras' clothing. Ultimately,
the investigation centered upon Watras' home2 which was found to have
radon levels over a thousand times greater than the United States
Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") recommended guideline.3
Although the dangers of exposure to radon were known as early
as the 1950s and 1960s from studies that revealed a greater incidence of
lung cancer among uranium miners,4 it was not until the Watras case
that the danger of naturally occurring residential radon contamination
became widely known.' The Watras case instantly focused national
attention on the potentially lethal nature of naturally occurring radon
gas.' Attorneys specializing in real estate matters began to examine the
legal issues surrounding the impending litigation over the presence of the
1. V. Elaine Smay, Radon Exclusive, POPULAR Sci., Nov. 1985, at 76-77.
2. The radon level in the Watras home was 100 times that allowed in uranium mines.
Id. at 77. The radiation exposure was equivalent to smoking 135 packs of cigarettes
per day. Michelle Galen, Lawyers Grapple With The Radon Issue: Litigation Surge
Likely, NAT'L L.J., July 21, 1986, at 1.
3. See Anne Rickard Jackowitz, Radon's Radioactive Ramifications: How Federal and
State Governments Should Address the Problem, 16 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. REv. 329, 330
(1988). The EPA suggested upper limit of acceptable radon contamination is four
picoCuries per liter or 0.02 working levels. Id. Although radon measurements are
often expressed in either picoCuries per liter ("pCi/FI") or working levels ("WL"), most
commentators, including those in the media, adopted the picoCuries per liter
measurement in making references to residential radon. That measurement standard
became particularly prevalent in the real estate profession. Consequently, most lay
persons became familiar with EPA's suggested standard of a safe indoor radon level
when expressed as four picoCuries per liter ("4 pCi/l") rather than .02 working levels
(".02 WL"). For uniformity, therefore, this article will discuss radon issues using the
more commonly used picoCuries per liter measurement. See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AOENCY & U.S. DEP'T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. No. OPA-86-004, A
CmzEN's GUIDE TO RADON: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT (1986)
[hereinafter A CmzEN's GUIDEJ. The Curie is the standard measurement for
radioactivity. This standard is too large for the radiation discussed in radon cases. The
usual unit utilized in radon cases, the picoCurie, is equal to one-millionth of a Curie.
See Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 330 n.6.
4. Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 329.
5. Id. at 329.
6. See Galen, supra note 2, at 1.
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naturally occurring gas.7 Moreover, federal and state agencies began
ambitious efforts to determine just how widespread a problem the
residential radon situation actually was.' Many commentators noted that
there would undoubtedly be a "surge of radon-related litigation in the
context of real estate transactions." 9 Some suggested that "[t]his surge
definitely has begun."'" Other commentators noted that radon is
responsible for as many as 20,000 lung cancer deaths annually in the
United States" and that "radon levels are the radiation equivalent of
having a Three Mile Island accident ... occur in the neighborhood every
week.' 2 Furthermore, federal environmental and health officials warned
the American public that contamination of homes across the nation by
cancer-causing radon has emerged as the nation's most serious air
7. Id. at 10; see Rorie Sherman, Radon and Real Estate: Potentially Costly Mixture,
N.J. L.J., Nov. 27, 1986, at 1 (1986).
8. Galen, supra note 2. See, e.g., Deborah A. Bannworth, Note, Radon In New Jersey:
Is It ime For Mandatory Testing?, 15 SEToN HALL LEGIS. J. 171, 171-73 (1991);
David Dearing, Comment, Radon Litigation: An Overview of Homeowners' Potential
Causes of Action, 20 CUMB. L. REv. 825, 827 (1990); Rita M. Nichols, Note,
Construction Contractors Confront the Indoor Radon Hazard: Homeowners' Private
Causes of Action and a Federal Response with the Indoor Radon Abatement Bill, 37
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 135, 161-67 (1990); Kevin L. Shepherd & Kevin A.
Gaynor, Radon: A Growing Menace in Real Estate Transactions, 3 PROB. & PRop. 6,
8 (May/June 1989); see generally Jackowitz, supra note 3; Janet I. Moore, The Radon
Review: The Federal and State Governments' Responses To Indoor Radon
Contamination, 7 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 39 (1988).
9. Galen, supra note 2, at 1.
10. Dearing, supra note 8, at 827. See also Frank B. Cross & Paula C. Murray,
Liability For Toxic Radon Gas In Residential Home Sales, 66 N.C. L. REv. 687, 688
(1988). Most commentators, however, have noted that there are few lawsuits involving
naturally occurring residential radon. See, e.g., Leonard Levin, Consumerism and Land
Sales, 15 PEPP. L. REv. 131, 136 (1988); Jeanne Prussman, The Radon Riddle:
Landlord Liability For A Natural Hazard, 18 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 715, 716
(1991); Donald A. Waltz, Comment, Radon Gas: Ramifications for Real Estate
Transactions in Pennsylvania, 91 DICK. L. REv. 1113, 1114 (1987); Stephen F.
Conaway, Grappling with Silent Invaders of the Home: Legal Remedies for Radon Gas
Contamination, 5 TEMP. ENvrL. L. & 'TECH. J. 36, 38 (1986); Paul A. Locke,
Promoting Radon Testing, Disclosure, and Remediation: Protecting Public Health
through the Home Mortgage Market, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10475, 10476-
77 (Nov. 1990).
11. See, e.g., Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 687; Galen, supra note 2, at 8.
12. Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 688 (quoting Nero, The Indoor Radon Story,
TECH. REv., Jan. 1986, at 28).
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pollution problem.13 Claiming that radon causes thousands of deaths
each year from lung cancer, federal officials issued a national health
advisory warning that "millions of homes have elevated radon levels" and
that "[r]adon-induced lung cancer is one of today's most serious public
health issues."14 Not surprisingly, such dire pronouncements is resulted
in virtually hysterical reactions among worried homeowners who
believed that they no longer could take refuge in their homes as safe
havens against the myriad dangers of the outside world.16
As the dust started to settle, however, the skeptics and naysayers
13. Mark Jaffe & Matthew Purdy, Radon Warning Issued: US. Says Homes Should
Be Tested, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 13, 1988, at 1-A.
14. Id.
15. Id. In 1988 Dr. Vernon J. Houk, assistant surgeon general of the United States
Public Health Service, said that residential radon "exceeds by 10 times the threat posed
by outdoor air pollution." Houk further declared that, "Radon exposure raises the risk
of lung cancer for a nonsmoker to that of a smoker. I would not buy a home, I would
not move into a home, without knowing what the radon content is in it." Id.
Moreover, at that same time, Lee M. Thomas, the Administrator of EPA noted that
radon was "a national problem" and that "[wle have found a broad level of elevated
radon in homes across the country. There are states where 40 to 60 percent of the
homes have a problem." Id. The federal officials warned that since the potential for
radon contamination is so widespread, the only people who are not advised to test their
homes are those living in apartments above the second floor of a building. Id.
16. The day following the federal warnings that millions of homes have dangerously
elevated levels of radon, worried homeowners swamped federal and state environmental
agencies with telephone calls. Steve Stecklow & Mark Jaffe, Radon Alert Worries
Homeowners in Area, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 14, 1988, at 1-A. Moreover, retail
outlets selling home radon testing kits in states such as Pennsylvania, where radon
levels were said to be particularly high, quickly sold out on the testing devices. Id
Homeowners who eventually did discover a radon problem were apprehensive about
acknowledging this fact for fear that their property would become stigmatized and,
consequently, lose its market value. Gene Austin, Air Fright: Radon Becomes a Real
Estate Problem, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 19, 1989, at 1-H. In 1989, further adding to
the radon hysteria, EPA announced that new evidence showed that radon is present in
high levels in classrooms across the United States and urged all school systems to test
for the radioactive gas and take remedial action if required. Philip Shabecoff, New
Data On Radon Prompt Call To Test All School Buildings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1989,
at Al. Researchers at Britain's National Radiation Protection Board announced that
natural radon was Americans' and Britons' greatest radiation threat. The researchers
claimed that radon was a greater menace than medical x-rays and nuclear reactors.
Radon Dangers, PHILA. INQUIRER, March 17, 1989, at 2-D. See also R. Randy Lee,
The Impact of Radon on Real Estate Transactions, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 19, 1990, at 33;
Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 336; Moore, supra note 8, at 39.
110
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began to cast doubts on whether ample scientific data existed to support
the warnings about residential radon. 7 EPA, meanwhile, maintained its
position that residential radon was a serious health threat. 8 The agency
17. See, e.g., Leonard A. Cole, Radon Scare - Where's The Proof?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
6, 1988, at A31 ("No relationship between illness and radon in homes has ever been
established in a scientific study. A presumed relationship exists only because of earlier
experiences of miners, particularly uranium miners."); Lee, supra note 16, at 33 ("Using
EPA's figures, radon is the second leading cause, next to smoking, of the more than
120,000 annual lung cancer deaths in the United States. But one study has since
indicated that of the lung cancer deaths attributed to radon, only about 500 were
nonsmokers, suggesting that much more research is needed on radon's true health
effects."); Eric Morgenthaler, For A Healthy Glow Some Old Folks Try A Dose of
Radon, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1990, at Al ("Most of these people suffer from ailments
of one sort or another .... They have journeyed to this remote part of the country ...
because there is something in the air of a handful of commercially operated 'health'
mines ... that they think will help them: Radon gas. The same stuff that federal health
authorities say can turn your house into a lethal weapon .... At a time when the very
mention of radioactivity is enough to clear out a neighborhood, a radon-gas 'health'
mine would seem to be an anachronism."); Paul Nussbaum, Radon Gains Respect In
Mont. "Health Mines," PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 12, 1989, at I-A ("In this pocket of
Montana's old mining country, a cluster of played-out diggings ... are enjoying second
lives as 'health mines,' drawing thousands of visitors searching for relief from arthritis,
diabetes, asthma and cancer. And the mystery curative is the same agent that the
Environmental Protection Agency considers the nation's top environmental cancer
danger: radon."); Malcolm W. Browne, Scientist Says Low Radon Levels May Be
Harmless, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1988, at B7 ("The physicist, Dr. Bernard L. Cohen of
the University of Pittsburgh, said the level of radon that is hazardous has not been
determined. ... But he cited data suggesting that the Government is being overly
cautious in urging renovation of millions of houses to reduce radon dangers."); Radon
Danger Estimate Lowered, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Feb. 2, 1991, at 9 ("A study issued by
the National Research Council said that earlier estimates of the risk of lung cancer in
homes [with radon] may have overstated the danger by 20 to 30 percent."); US.
Overestimates Peril ofRadon in Homes, New Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 1991,
at B6 ("A new study suggests that Americans are exposed to only about a third as much
radon inside their homes as monitoring devices indicate, and that many have probably
spent money needlessly to get rid of the gas."); Radon: Cancer Killer?, POPULAR SCI.,
May 1989, at 8 ("In counties where lung cancer in women would have been expected
to be up 25 percent from the [elevated] radon levels, the incidence of cancer were
actually down 30 percent.").
18. EPA responded to the National Academy of Sciences report that the estimates of
the risk of lung cancer caused by residential radon may have overstated the danger by
20 to 30% by announcing that it would probably reduce its estimates of the amount of
lung cancer caused by radon gas in homes. Warren E. Leary, US. Study Finds A
Reduced Cancer Danger From Radon In Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1991, at A10.
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did not, however, assume an active part in pursuing legislation mandating
the testing for and remediation of residential radon. 9 Rather, the
federal government assumed and has maintained an advisory role, leaving
the states and local governments to attend to the specifics of how to
handle, if at all, the problems associated with the pollution.2"
The surge in case law forecasted by some commentators" never
materialized during the decade since Stanley Watras' predicament made
radon a household word, notwithstanding the fact that numerous articles
suggested many legal approaches to recovery of damages for
homeowners who found dangerous levels of radon in their homes.
22
Moreover, public interest in the radon problem took a precipitous decline
"An environmental agency official said the new estimate of deaths from lung cancer
caused by radon would probably be 16,000 a year, down from 21,000." Id. See
Clearing The Air, APPLE SEEDS: A PUBLICATION FOR U.S. HEALTHCARE MEMBERS,
Spring/Summer 1992, at 28 [herinafter Clearing the Air]. The EPA now estimates that
14% of lung cancer deaths that occur each year (143,000 in 1991) are attributable to
radon. Id. at 29.
19. See Mark Jaffe, Radon: An Enemy of a Different Stripe, PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept.
18, 1988, at 1-C. EPA officials did not believe that a massive federal program was
necessary or desirable. "'With radon we are dealing with a different problem than the
agency has traditionally dealt with,' said Margo Oge, director of EPA's radon program.
'Radon occurs naturally. It is not a regulatory problem,' she said. 'We can't regulate
the earth or homeowners.' The radon problem will have to be dealt with, EPA and
state officials agree, house by house." Id.
20. Id. The federal government sees its role as a catalyst, not a principal mover in the
resolution of the radon problem. EPA "will develop data about radon dangers, target
high risk areas, provide information to the public and regulate the industry that tests
and cleans up radon." Id. See also Locke, supra note 10, at 10,476; Jackowitz, supra
note 3, at 337-44; Moore, supra note 8, at 47-49; see infra notes 21-233 and
accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Galen, supra note 2, at 1; Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 688;
Dearing, supra note 8, at 827.
22. See, e.g., Nichols, supra note 8; Shepherd & Gaynor, supra note 8, at 8-9; Levin,
supra note 10, at 136; Carolyn M. Shuko, Radon Gas: Contractor Liability for an
Indoor Health Hazard, 37 DEF. L.J. 361, 369-388 (1988); Cross & Murray, supra note
10, at 702-24; Sheldon Winicour, Note, Clearing The Air On Radon Testing: The Duty
Of Real Estate Brokers To Protect Prospective Homebuyers, 15 FORD. URB. L.J. 767,
773-95 (1987); Dearing, supra note 8, at 830-46; Waltz, supra note 10, at 1118-55;
Mary Rose Komreich, Dealing with the Invisible Trap of Radon Liability, PRAC. REAL
EST. LAW, Sept. 1987, at 17, 23-30 (1987); Kevin L. Shepherd, Drafting Radon
Contingency Clauses, PRAC. REAL EST. LAw, Jan. 1990, at 43, 44-50 (1990); Conaway,
supra note 10, at 38-48; FRANK B. CROSS, LEGAL RESPONSES TO INDOOR AIR
POLLUTION 133-52 (1990).
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as the ten year anniversary of the discovery of the radon dilemma
approached, despite the fact that EPA periodically reaffirmed its position
on the dangers of residential radon.' I
At the same time, the public interest and concern seemed to be
focused on the newest "danger of the month," such as power lines that
emit electromagnetic fields, or EMFs, and computer terminal radiation,
among others.2 4
This Article examines the status of the residential radon problem
after its first decade since discovery as a "widespread national
problem"25 and "one of today's most serious public health issues." 26
Section I of this Article examines the source and extent of the radon
problem. Section II examines the legislative and judicial responses to
residential radon during the past ten years. Included in this section is a
discussion of the probable legal theories under which litigation would
likely proceed in actions involving the sale of residential real estate and
an analysis of the reasons why the anticipated surge of litigation
involving radon has not yet materialized. Section III looks to the
residential radon problem in the years ahead with a discussion of
recommendations for legislative initiatives as well as private efforts to
foster testing for and remediation of radon contamination.
I. THE RADON PROBLEM: WHAT IS IT?
Radon is a colorless, odorless, tasteless, radioactive gas emitted
from naturally decaying uranium found in the earth's crust.27 As one
23. Locke, supra note 10, at 10,475-76. The author notes, "[D]espite efforts to educate
homeowners and others about radon's dangers and how to cope with them, Americans'
response so far has been spotty." Id. at 10,475. Moreover, the author states, "Despite
these efforts to inform the public ... only about two percent of the nation's homeowners
have acted to identify or correct radon problems." Id. at 10,476.
24. See, e.g., Tungsten-Halogen Bulbs May Pose a Hazard, N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 1991,
at C4 (concerning ultraviolet radiation); Karen Auge, Owners Find Their Homes On the
Line, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 2, 1992, at 4-BC (concerning electromagnetic fields
(EMFs) caused by power lines); Ronald E. Roel, Low-Level Radiation Becomes A Hfigh-
Level Concern, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), March 25, 1990, at 70 (concerning radiation
emissions from computer terminals); On Healthy Indoor Air, and Avoiding Suits, N.Y.
TIMES, May 15, 1992, at B20 (concerning "sick buildings" caused by lack of ventilation
and unsatisfactory heating and air conditioning design).
25. Prussman, supra note 10, at 715.
26. Jaffe & Purdy, supra note 13, at Al.
27. See generally A CITIZEN's GUIDE, supra note 3.
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commentator explained:
Three different isotopes of uranium are present in the
earth's crust: uranium-238, -235, and -234. Radon-222
(radon gas) is produced midway through the decay cycle
of uranium-238. Although it is an inert gas that does not
react chemically with other elements or compounds, it
undergoes radioactive decay and produces "radon
progeny" or "radon daughters." Unlike radon, these radon
progeny (polonium, bismuth, lead-214, and lead-210) are
electrically charged and chemically active. They can
attach themselves to air particles and when inhaled
become lodged in the lung. Trapped inside the lung in
close proximity to sterile lung tissue, radon progeny
continue to decay, giving off radiation that can weaken,
chemically alter, or damage the lung."
Uranium is commonly found in rocks such as granite, shale and
limestone.29 Radon may also be found in soils which have been
contaminated with certain types of industrial wastes."0 After being
released into the air as a gas during the breakdown of uranium, radon
can be found in the atmosphere and in enclosed spaces.3' Radon
released into the outside air is virtually harmless because it is diluted to
such low concentrations. 32 Indoor radon, on the other hand, because it
is trapped, can accumulate to dangerously high levels.33 The problem
is exacerbated in structures built since the energy-conscious 1970s and
1980s when energy efficiency in homebuilding was universally touted by
builders as a selling point. While helping to conserve energy and lower
28. Locke, supra note 10, at 10,475 n.2. The radiation given off during the decay
process may affect DNA molecules in a manner which reorganizes its molecular
structure and changes the cell's genetic coding. If the cell still remains capable of
reproducing, it may become abnormal or cancerous. Shuko, supra note 22, at 363.
29. Shuko, supra note 22, at 362-63.
30. A CiTIZEN's GUIDE, supra note 3, at 1.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Indoor radon levels are typically five to ten times higher than outdoor levels.
However, depending upon the concentration of radon in the soil surrounding a structure
as well as the construction of the structure, radon levels can be several thousand times
higher than the outdoor level. Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 331 n.15.
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energy costs, such efforts at airtight construction reduced ventilation
which dilutes radon concentrations.34 Although the principal method in
which radon gains access to structures is through seepage from
surrounding soil,3" radon may also enter structures from building
materials, such as bricks or stone, and from well water.3
A. Residential Radon: Its Discovery and Health Risks
Although the dangers of residential radon did not become a matter
of public concern until publicized pursuant to the Watras case,37 health
concerns have been associated with uranium and radium mining since the
1500s. 3' The premature deaths of such miners due to respiratory illness
were linked to malignant lung tumors almost three hundred years
later.39 Because the miners excavated other minerals at the same time
they excavated uranium, no definite link to uranium could be
established.'
Uranium mining began in the United States during the 1940s. In
1972, a study by the National Academy of Sciences Committee on
Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation found that the incidence of
cancer among American workers was directly proportional to their
exposure to radon gas.41 As uranium mining continues today,4" one
34. Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 331.
35. Id. at 332. Because radon is a gas, it can travel through small spaces in soil and
rock and seep into homes through dirt floors, cracks in concrete floors and walls, floor
drains, sump pump holes, joints or small cracks or pores in hollow-block walls. A
CITIZEN'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 4.
36. A CrITzEN's GUIDE, supra note 3, at 4. When homes have some brick or stone
construction, radon may be released from these building materials into the home.
Moreover, radon may enter the water in private wells and be released into the air in the
home when the water is used. Large community water supplies do not typically pose
this problem since the radon would likely be released into the outside air before the
water reaches the home. Id. See also U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTON AoENCY, PUB. No.
OPA-87-011, REMOVAL OF RADON FROM HOUSEHOLD WATER, (1987) [hereinafter
REMOVAL OF RADON FROM HOUSEHOLD WATER].
37. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
38. Shuko, supra note 22, at 364.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 364-65.
42. States where uranium mining still exists include New Mexico, Arizona, Utah and
Colorado. Id. at 364 n.26.
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commentator noted:
This continued exposure to uranium and its radon
byproducts, as well as the increased awareness of radon's
carcinogenic effects, have led American miners to bring
negligence suits against mining companies. These suits
have alleged failures to maintain a healthy work
environment. Miners have also sued the Environmental
Protection Agency ..., challenging its standards for the
disposal of uranium mill tailings.43
These negligence suits are among the few precedents available to
courts when confronted with plaintiffs' claims of naturally occurring
residential radon-induced injury.
The Stanley Watras case, however, galvanized the issue of
naturally occurring radon gas in the residential environment. In
December 1984, Stanley Watras set off a radiation detection device as he
reported for work." Watras triggered the alarm while approximately
three feet away from a radiation detection device at the Limerick Nuclear
Power Plant where he was employed as an engineer.4" After it was
determined that Watras was not picking up radiation at the power plant,
Watras and his wife decided to test their split level home located in
Boyertown, Pennsylvania.46  They discovered that their home was
contaminated with an excess amount of radon gas. The home registered
a reading of 4400 picoCuries per liter of air ("pCi/l"), more than one
43. Id. at 365 (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Begay v. Kear-McGee Corp., 499 F. Supp.
1317, 1317-25 (D. Ariz. 1980) (alleging that exposure to radon while working in
defendant's mine caused decedents to contract cancer). The uranium mill tailings cases
involve radioactive waste materials of the uranium milling process. During the 1950s
to mid 1960s builders in Grand Junction, Colorado, used tailings as landfill. During
the late 1960s, it was discovered that homes and other structures built upon the tailings
fill had significant concentrations of radon gas. See Shuko, supra note 22, at 365 n.3 1;
see also Brafford v. Susquehana Corp., 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984); American
Mining Congress v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 617 (10th Cir. 1985); T & E Industries v. Safety
Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249 (N.J. 1991).
44. Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 329.
45. Shuko, supra note 22, at 367.
46. Galen, supra note 2, at 1.
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thousand times the EPA's suggested maximum of 4 pCi/l.4  The radon
levels in the home were said to be the equivalent of smoking 135 packs
of cigarettes per day or being exposed to 455,000 ,chest x-rays per
year.
48
What made the Watras case so noteworthy and newsworthy was
the distressing fact that the extremely high radon levels in the home were
the result of an entirely natural phenomenon. There were no toxic waste
dumps or other man-made activities at play except for the energy
efficient construction of a relatively airtight house which diminished
drafts and other avenues for radon-diluting ventilation. As Stanley
Watras stated, "Man didn't put [radon] in the ground; who are we going
to sue, God?"'49
As noted earlier, the original sources of naturally occurring
residential radon are the uranium and radium in the earth's crust.5 0
Virtually every geographic area contains some amount of these
elements."1 Consequently, radon gas is emitted from the earth's crust
throughout the world. There are, however, varying concentrations of
these elements in the earth's crust. Thus, higher radon gas levels are
found in areas where there is a greater concentration of uranium soils."2
In the United States, the highest concentrations of uranium soils have
been found in the Reading Prong area of eastern Pennsylvania, western
New Jersey, Florida, most of New England, the eastern slope of the
Appalachians, the Georgia and Carolina coasts and in scattered areas in
Wisconsin, Minnesota and west of the Rocky Mountains. 3 .Even within
these high concentration areas, it is not uncommon for one house to have
high levels of indoor radon and for an adjacent property to have a
negligible level.5 4 Furthermore, although indoor radon levels are clearly
47. Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 330; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
The government's upper limit of 4 pCi/i is by no means considered to be a totally safe
radon level. "By the government's own admission, people living in homes
contaminated at a level of 4 picoCuries face the same risk of lung cancer as they would
from smoking a half-pack of cigarettes a day or from receiving 200 chest x-rays a
year." Matthew Purdy, Guideline On Radon Misleading, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 24,
1988, at I-A.
48. Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 330.
49. Galen, supra note 2, at 1.
50. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
51. See CRoss, supra note 22, at 6.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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related to the soil concentrations in the particular area, it does not follow,
a priori, that areas of relatively low uranium soil concentration are free
from the residential radon hazard. As one commentator noted, "Soil gas
flow and other factors also matter. For example, the Spokane River
Valley has only average soil radium content, but many homes in the
valley have unusually high indoor radon concentrations."55
Radon gas enters houses and builds to high concentrations in a
variety of ways. Typically, the gas seeps through cracks in foundations
and tiny pores or cracks in hollow-block walls, as well as through
openings specifically made for water, sewage or gas pipes.56 Even
houses with no discernable cracks in solid concrete foundations cannot
totally prevent radon gas seepage. 7  One commentator noted, "It is
impossible to construct a building that prevents the entry of radon
gas.,,s
Radon gas can also enter private well water and be released into
the air when the water is used. " Although viewed as a much less
serious source of radon contamination, EPA estimates that radon released
from household water use causes from 100 to 1800 lung cancer deaths
each year.60 Similarly, building materials, such as concrete blocks or
55. Id. at 7. In a letter to the editor, William N. Stasiuk, Director, Center for
Environmental Health, New York Department of Health, noted that high radon levels
can occur anywhere in New York state, even in areas of normal or low concentrations
of radium in the soil. Stasiuk explained:
These areas are characterized by gravel deposits in which the ground
water is more than 10 feet to 20 feet below the surface. Indoor radon
levels become elevated because soil gas moves easily through gravel,
and more of it can be pulled into the indoor environment. We urge
people who live in such areas to test for radon.
William N. Stasiuk, Radon In Homes Associated With Gravel Deposits and Soil Gas,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1991, at A28.
56. See CROSS, supra note 22, at 7; see also A CrnzEN's GUIDE, supra note 3, at 4.
57. See CROSS, supra note 22, at 7.
58. Id.
59. A CrIzEN's GUIDE, supra note 3, at 4.
60. See REMOVAL OF RADON FROM HOUSEHOLD WATER, supra note 36, at 1. One
commentator noted that:
In some locations, however, ... water or natural gas may produce
significant amounts of radon exposure. Radon gas may escape from
water during showering, washing, drinking, and related activities.
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bricks produced from materials containing radioactive elements, may be
a source of indoor radon contamination. Although not considered a
primary source, building materials may account for three to ten percent
of all radon exposure or up to 2000 deaths yearly."
Shortly after the discovery of naturally occurring radon in the
Watras home, EPA began conducting a nationwide radon-assessment
survey.62 EPA found that radon may be a problem throughout the
United States,63 and in 1988 declared that contamination of homes
across the nation by cancer-causing radon was the nation's "most
serious" air pollution problem." Moreover, a joint announcement by
the Administrator of EPA and the Assistant Surgeon General of the
United States Public Health Service recommended that virtually every
home in the nation should be tested for radon gas.6 Furthermore, the
federal officials warned that millions of homes had elevated levels of
radon, that an estimated 20,000 deaths each year were caused by radon,
that radon exposure exceeds by ten times the threat posed by outdoor air
pollution, that radon gas was second only to cigarette smoking as a cause
of lung cancer and that radon exposure raises the risk of lung cancer for
a nonsmoker to that of a smoker. 66  Finally, Dr. Vernon J. Houk,
Radon concentrations in New England well water run into tens of
thousands of picocuries per liter (pCi/L) [sic], and radon levels tend
to be higher in privately supplied water. The American Medical
Association estimated that privately supplied water in the New
England and Appalachian regions may account for 35 percent of
indoor radon air exposures in these regions. Water wells in Georgia
often exceed 2,000 pCi/L of radon. Texas and the Carolinas also
have high average levels of radon in groundwater. In the 18 percent
of homes using private wells for their water supplies, water may
contribute an average of 0.5 pCi/L radon to the indoor air. In more
than 1 percent of U.S. homes, well water causes indoor exposures of
I pCi/L or greater, in addition to whatever indoor level is caused by
ground emissions.
CROSS, supra note 22, at 10 (footnotes omitted).
61. CRoss, supra note 22, at 10.
62. Galen, supra note 2, at 8.
63. CROSS, supra note 22, at 8.
64. Jaffe & Purdy, supra note 13, at 1-A.
65. Id.
66. Id. Radon is said to be 15 times more dangerous to smokers because they do not
exhale it as readily as nonsmokers. Id. While exposure to radon is typically linked to
lung cancer, and occasionally stomach cancer, a British study also linked exposure to
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Assistant Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service
announced that he would not buy or move into a home without knowing
the radon level in it.
67
A building's construction characteristics play a major role in
determining whether the building is likely to have a potential radon
problem. One commentator summarized the building's role in assessing
the likelihood of radon contamination:
Houses with basements, crawl spaces, and sump holes
tend to have higher concentrations ... [ T]he number and
size of cracks and penetrations of the foundation affect the
amount of radon entering a house. One study found that
"[r]adon levels in houses where [the slab] is badly cracked
seem to be only about 30 % higher than in houses where
it is uncracked." This feature of foundations seems less
significant, however, than do pressure differentials.
Differences in pressure and temperature between
the indoor and outdoor environments may suck high levels
of radon into a house, much as a vacuum draws a gas.
Differences in temperature cause pressure differentials.
Heating a house creates a convection pattern that draws in
radon gas to leukemia in children and adults, brain, spine, bone and skin cancer in
children, and kidney and skin cancer in adults. See Edith M. Lederer, Radon Linked
To Variety Of Cancers, PHILA. INQUIRER, April 29, 1990, at 5-A; Prussman, supra note
10, at 721.
67. Jaffe & Purdy, supra note 13. The joint announcement of EPA and the U.S.
Public Health Service was prompted by a survey of 11,000 homes in seven states that
found dangerous levels of radon in almost one-third of the homes. Id. EPA estimated,
therefore, that as many as eight million homes across the nation may be tainted.
Moreover, the federal officials noted that the potential for radon contamination is so
widespread that they suggested only people living in apartments above the second floor
of a building need not test for radon contamination. Id. The survey revealed, for
example, that 31% of the homes examined in Pennsylvania had levels of radon above
the EPA guideline of 4 pCi/l and that 65% of the homes in North Dakota and 40% of
the homes in Minnesota had high radon readings. Id. at 6-A. The government's
announcement not only triggered a firestorm of concern from worried homeowners, but
it also firmly established in the public mind the 4 pCi/l standard as the threshold value
for radon remediation. Notwithstanding EPA's own admission that 4 pCi/I is not
necessarily a safe level, but rather a technologically attainable level, the 4 pCi/I
measurement initially assumed prodigious power in making or breaking real estate
sales. Id See Austin, supra note 16.
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air from its understructure. Wind may also depressurize
the interior of a house. This effect is exacerbated by
installed equipment, including exhaust fans, fireplaces, and
even water heaters. The pressure-differential factor
apparently explains a great deal of radon entry in housing.
The rate of radon entry explains only a part of
indoor radon exposure. The rate of radon exit has an
equally powerful effect on indoor concentrations. Even
high entry levels will not produce high concentrations, if
the radon quickly exits the house. The exit of radon is
largely dependent on the ventilation of a building,
typically measured in air changes per hour .... Buildings
with high ventilation levels typically have lower levels of
indoor radon and other pollutants."6
The energy conservation efforts of the 1970s, particularly in new
home construction, have only added to the lack of ventilation. Although
the finding is controversial,69 the more energy-efficient home actually
may present a more serious potential for radon contamination.7°
In addition to the controversy surrounding the impact of energy-
efficient construction on indoor radon levels, an even livelier debate
68. CROSS, supra note 22, at 8 (footnotes omitted).
69. See id. at 8-9. The controversy surrounding energy conservation methods and
indoor radon concentrations seems to be primarily related to the fact that some energy-
efficient construction methods may in fact impede the ability of radon gas to enter the
structure in the first instance. See id. at 9. The general indication, however, is that
energy-efficient construction methods more often exacerbate the radon problem than
reduce it. See id As one commentator pointed out:
Some [studies] have found that energy-efficient homes have two to
five times the indoor radon concentrations. EPA once estimated that
the Department of Energy's weatherization program perversely would
cause thousands of additional deaths from indoor radon. Other recent
studies have found little or no correlation between reduced ventilation
rates and increased radon concentration. ... Nevertheless it is a
physical certainty that, for any given entry rate, reduced ventilation
will increase indoor radon concentrations.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
70. See id. at 9. Where radon is present in a building, its concentration will be
inversely proportional to the ventilation rate. Id. For example, a 50% reduction in
ventilation will double the indoor radon concentration. Id.
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exists about the level of radon exposure that should be deemed a
significant health risk. Notwithstanding all of the attention the problem
of residential radon contamination has received during the past decade,
there appears to be only one certainty among commentators concerning
the health risks posed by the naturally occurring gas: A causal
relationship exists between exposure to high levels of radon and
increased incidence of lung cancer.7 ' The controversy, and hence the
confusion, concerns the level of radon exposure which poses a significant
health risk.7' Although it appears well-settled that indoor radon
contamination may be a problem throughout the United States, "experts
have heatedly debated what should constitute an 'acceptable standard' for
indoor radon levels."73 Scientists have not yet been able to determine
the lowest level of radon that increases one's risk of developing lung
cancer over a period of time.74 As one commentator noted, "The task,
therefore, is to define the minimum radon level that may cause
significant harm to building occupants."01
Following the publicity engendered by the Watras case, EPA
examined published data concerning radon exposure in the mining
industry.76  By extrapolating the data relating to the miners, EPA
arrived at a recommended maximum average level of indoor radon of 4
pCi/l. The EPA guideline of 4 pCi/l is considered to be an action
level -- a level above which remediation to reduce the amount of indoor
radon should be contemplated. With regard to a 4 pCi/I reading or
lower, EPA advised: "Exposures in this range are considered average or
slightly above average for residential structures. Although exposures in
this range do present some risk of lung cancer, reductions of levels this
low may be difficult, and sometimes impossible, to achieve. 79
71. See Kornreich, supra note 22, at 18.
72. See id.; Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 696.
73. Shepherd & Gaynor, supra note 8, at 7. Any exposure to radiation, such as radon,
is considered potentially unhealthy. See Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 696.
Consequently, there is no completely safe level of radon exposure. See id This
assumption is not presently supported by epidemiological data. See id.; Kornreich,
supra note 22, at 19.
74. See Shelley Bookspan, Radon: The Risks of a Natural Gas, 19 REAL EST. L.J.
363, 364 (1991).
75. Cross & Muray, supra note 10, at 696.
76. See Bookspan, supra note 74, at 364.
77. A CITIZEN'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 7.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 11.
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Because epidemiological data for indoor radon is virtually no.-
existent, 80 the actual risk of lung cancer at or above 4 pCi/l is not
known.8 EPA estimated that out of 1000 persons exposed to a radon
level of 200 pCi/l for seventy years, 440 to 770 are expected to die of
radon-induced lung cancer.8 2 For comparison purposes, their risk is
deemed slightly greater than that of a four pack-per-day cigarette
smoker." For readings at this level, EPA recommends that
homeowners take action within weeks to reduce indoor radon levels.84
Similarly, exposure to radon at levels between 20 and 200 pCi/I is
considered too far above average and should be remediated within
several months.8" Out of 1000 persons exposed for seventy years to a
reading of 20 pCi/l, 60 to 210 are expected to die of radon-induced lung
cancer. 86 Even exposure at 4 pCi/ is said to pose the risk of lung
cancer for between 13 and 50 people for every 1000 exposed at that level
to indoor radon over a seventy year period.87
EPA estimated that approximately 5000 to 20,000 residential
radon-induced lung cancer deaths occur each year.88 At the height of
the 1988 media blitz concerning the issue of indoor radon, the larger
estimate was almost universally used.8 As one commentator observed,
"Many sources now have broadcast the news that indoor radon exposures
80. See Kornreich, supra note 22, at 19. Some studies examining the radon levels in
homes of persons dying from lung cancer to levels in homes of those dying from other
causes suggest that the estimates of risk proffered by EPA are reasonable. See id; see
also Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 696-97 (discussing the reliability of the EPA's
indoor radon level guidelines).
81. See Bookspan, supra note 75, at 364.
82. A CiTZEN'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 9.
83. Id at 10.
84. Id. at 11.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 10.
87. See Kornreich, supra note 22, at 19; A CITIZEN'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 10.
EPA estimates are based not only upon a 70 year exposure but also are premised upon
a person's spending 75% of their time in the home. See Konireich, supra, note 22, at
19.
88. See A CrIZEN's GUIDE, supra note 3, at 1.
89. See, e.g., Behind the Door: Pollution is Bad Outside, But Problems Also Lurk
Within, CHICAGO TRIB., Dec. 18, 1988, at D18; Radon-Cancer Link Examined in Study,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1988, at B2; Sam Hankin, Codes Changing Slowly to Meet
Radon Threat, Wash. Post, Nov. 12, 1988, at E2.
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may be responsible for 20,000 deaths annually."9 Moreover, lifestyles
are said to impact the risk of radon-induced cancer. For example,
smokers and children are believed to be more susceptible and those who
sleep or spend considerable time in lower portions of a house, such as
basements, are said to be at greater risk.9"
Although EPA made clear that its projections on the health risk
of radon were estimates based upon scientific studies of miners exposed
to varying levels of radon gas in their work,92 and although most
commentators evidenced no serious objections to EPA's strong warnings
on indoor radon based upon those studies,93 EPA's warning and the
panic it created to test for and remedy indoor radon soon came under
attack.9" Most critics claimed that EPA's guideline of 4 pCi/1 as the
action level for indoor radon remediation was too stringent and was not
supported by actual scientific data. There was also criticism which
claimed that EPA's 4 pCi/l action level was misleading the members of
the public into a false sense of safety if their homes tested at or near the
4 pCi/l level."
Shortly after EPA's 1988 announcement that indoor radon was the
nation's most serious air pollution problem,96 an epidemiologist at the
National Cancer Institute declared that even if radon were reduced in all
homes to EPA's recommended 4 pCi/l level, there would be only a
marginal reduction in the health risk posed by indoor radon."7
90. Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 696. In 1991, following a report released by
the National Academy of Sciences that said earlier estimates of the risk of lung cancer
caused by indoor radon may have overstated the danger by 20 to 30%, EPA indicated
that it would probably reduce its estimates. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying
text.
91. See A CIzEN'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 12; Winicour, supra note 22, at 768 n.5.
92. See A CITIZEN'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 2.
93. See, e.g., Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 696-97. The authors noted that, "The
studies of radon risk have taken identified risk levels [gathered by measuring uranium
miners] and extrapolated downward to the radon levels found in the indoor
environment. While some uncertainties remain in this risk assessment process, the
procedure is regularly employed by expert government agencies and may even
understate the true risks of indoor radon." Id. (footnotes omitted).
94. Id.
95. See Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 698.
96. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
97. Purdy, supra note 47, at 4-A. EPA has admitted that the 4 pCi/I threshold is not
necessarily a safe level of indoor radon: "'The risks at 4 [pCi/Il are not insignificant.'
... 'It's equivalent perhaps to smoking a half a [sic] pack of cigarettes a day. That's
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Although EPA attempted to disclaim any efforts on its part to encourage
reliance upon its 4 pCi/I threshold as absolutely safe, that standard
nonetheless assumed extraordinary powers among homeowners, the real
estate industry and professional radon testers.98 Some members of
Congress expressed similar concerns about the EPA's 4 pCi/l
guideline.99 Then Congressman James J. Florio (D., N.J.) charged that
the EPA's "standard kills people. ... It's almost a semi-fradulent [sic]
maybe more risk than some people'want to accept. We have to dispel the image that
4 [pCi/1] is safe flying."' Id. EPA's position in recommending the 4 pCi/l guideline
is based upon pragmatic considerations:
[T]he [4 pCi/l] guideline was set because federal officials believed
that radon in most contaminated homes could be reduced to that level
fairly easily without frustrating, scaring or bankrupting homeowners
.... Mechnology makes it difficult and expensive to reduce radon
much further in most homes. ... [T]he federal government has
essentially told people to stop trying once they reach 4 picocuries, not
because it is a safe level, but because it is -- as government officials
say -- "doable."
Id.
98. See id The critics of EPA's use of the 4 pCi/l guideline contend that the standard
gives a false sense of security to homeowners who test their property and receive
reports of radon contamination in the 4 pCi/l range. See id.
"If it's below 4 [pCi/l], most people believe they're safe and clear,"
said Harold Stesis, president of the U.S. Toxic Substance Testing
Bureau, a Philadelphia-based company that conducts radon testing
nationwide. "If you try to give advice that's not in accordance with
the EPA, you're really putting your neck on the line."
Id. Prior to using the 4 pCi/l standard, EPA considered setting no guideline because
it was believed that no level of radon was considered safe. Id.
However, upon further reflection it was feared that without a guideline, no one
would act. Id. Unfortunately, the subtleties of EPA's suggested guideline of 4 pCi/l
have been lost on the public. One residential radon mitigation contractor noted that the
4 pCi/l level can be crucial when it comes to selling a home: "'If the level in your
home tests at 4.1 [pCi/1, you might have trouble selling it."' Austin, supra note 16, at
4-H. Moreover, the contractor noted that the issue of radon testing and remediation has
become a real estate problem: "'What's happening is that a lot of real estate
transactions are being determined by a radon screening, but there are actually no
protocols for testing under real estate conditions."' Id. at I-H.
99.. See Purdy, supra note 47, at 4-A.
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representation. EPA should not be affirmatively misleading people. °100
However, it was the critics who charged that the 4 pCi/l guideline
was too stringent and unsupported by scientific data who received the
lion's share of the publicity. Following EPA's announcement concerning
the dangers of indoor radon, Dr. Bernard L. Cohen, a physicist at the
University of Pittsburgh, asserted that the level of radon that is hazardous
has not been determined. He cited data suggesting that EPA was being
too cautious in urging remediation of millions of houses to reduce radon
levels. "0  Dr. Cohen based his findings on a review of studies of
average radon levels and average lung cancer rates in countries such as
the United States, Scandinavia and China. He found that areas with high
concentrations of naturally occurring radon tended to have low average
rates of lung cancer."o
One commentator argued that federal officials were advising the
American public about allegedly dangerous radon levels prematurely. As
a result, homeowners were testing and remedying homes before
epidemiological studies confirmed the need to take such costly
measures.'0 3  Furthermore, he concluded that even if a correlation
100. Id. Florio charged that even radon below 4 pCfil is unsafe. "'The Environmental
Protection Agency is not telling people the full story, because it would cost more to do
the job right,' Florio said ... at a hearing of the National Cancer Advisory Board."
Austin, supra note 16. Florio also contended that setting a lower guideline would
provide the incentive to develop the technology to reach the lower standards. See
Purdy, supra note 47, at 4-A.
101. See Browne, supra note 17.
102. Id. Although Federal health officials have estimated that long-term exposure to
radon is responsible for 5,000 to 20,000 lung cancer deaths each year, they do concede
that most of these deaths occur among people who smoke. Id. Smoking greatly
increases the risk of radon. Id. Dr. Cohen, of the University of Pittsburgh, argued that
a threshold value of radon below which there is no health risk exists. Id. He noted an
area in southeastern Finland where homes have an average radon level of 8 pCi/l, which
is eight times as high as the world average and three times the average for Finland as
a whole, and yet the lung cancer rate is significantly lower than in other areas of
Finland. Id. Moreover, he cited another study of a county in Sweden where there is
an average indoor radon level of 12 pCi/l, which is the highest yet reported for a large
area, but where the lung cancer rate is only 75% as high as Sweden's national average.
Id. 1
103. See Cole, supra note 17. Cole is critical of EPA's guideline on residential radon
since it is based on the studies involving uranium miners:
Radon is a breakdown product of uranium, and miners
exposed for years to high levels of it suffered higher rates of lung
126
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between indoor radon and lung cancer could be established, the
postponement of remedial action for a few years would have a negligible
impact on the health of the residents because the supposed dangers of
indoor radon are premised upon many years of exposure.° 4
The most serious challenge to EPA's position on the risk of
indoor radon based upon the experience of miners came in 1991 when
the National Academy of Sciences released a report by its National
Research Council. The report found that earlier estimates of the risk of
lung cancer caused by indoor radon may have been overstated by twenty
to thirty percent.' 05 The report "concluded that 'direct extrapolation of
risk estimates from the mining to the home environment may
cancer than the general population. But to assume that the radon
concentrations affecting miners automatically apply to homeowners
disregards important differences between the two environments.
The miners inhaled radon's radioactive particles, which had
become attached to swirling dust generated by mining activities.
Before ventilation systems were installed, radon concentrations were
unremitting and miners were exposed to large amounts daily.
In homes, continuous swirls of dust are absent and
radioactive particles are less likely to be inhaled. This is all the more
true where people do not smoke. Concentrations of the gas and
exposure of individuals may vary dramatically with the time of day,
seasons, weather conditions and opening and closing of windows and
doors. One or two high readings in the home may signal none of the
health consequences of those in a mine.
Id. Cole also notes a study by the New Jersey Department of Health in which an effort
to find a correlation between residential radon and lung cancer was unsuccessful. Id.
104. Id. Other commentators have suggested that the government may be acting
prematurely in recommending remediation at lower levels of indoor contamination:
The EPA, however, estimates that from 5,000 to 20,000 lung cancer
deaths are caused annually when radon is trapped and builds up to
higher levels in buildings. Using EPA's figures, radon is the second
leading cause, next to smoking, of the more than 120,000 annual lung
cancer deaths in the United States. But one study has since indicated
that of the lung cancer deaths attributed to radon, only about 500 were
nonsmokers, suggesting that much more research is needed on radon's
true health effects.
Lee, supra note 16.
105. See Leary, supra note 18.
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overestimate the numbers of radon-caused lung cancer cases.'"0 6  The
report specifically questioned the application of studies on miners
breathing radon in mines to homeowners breathing radon indoors: "But
if levels of radon exposure are equal in a home and in a mine, ... the
lung tissues of miners get a greater dose of radiation than those of people
in the home because the miners are breathing more deeply from
exertion. "107  In response to the report released by the National
Academy of Sciences, EPA said it would probably reduce its estimates
of the amount of lung cancer caused by indoor radon."'
Shortly thereafter, another study questioned EPA's estimate of the
risks of indoor radon. A study conducted by Dr. Naomi H. Harley, a
radiological expert at New York University Medical Center, found that
homeowners are exposed to only a third as much radon inside their
homes as monitoring devices indicate. " The study was the first to
examine how much radon people are actually exposed to rather than how
much radon is found in a particular part of the house."' Again, an
EPA spokesperson said the agency may eventually revise their risk
estimates. 1
106. Id.
107. Id. The study challenged the application of the miners' experience to the home
environment due to the fact that there is a higher breathing rate caused by the exertion
put forth by the miners. Thus, the report noted, the miners were breathing increased
amounts of air and radon. The report did concede, however, that radon-carrying dust
particles in the home are smaller than in the mines and can be breathed deeper into the
lungs. The report concluded, however, that the impact of rapid breathing in the mines
probably outweighed the breathing of smaller particles. Id.
108. Id. EPA indicated that it requested the study because of concern regarding the
relationship between the miners' health experience with radon and the residential
population. Id. An EPA spokesperson concluded that "'[t]he new estimates may give
us lower numbers, but it increases our confidence in those numbers .... "' Id.
109. See U.S. Overestimates Peril of Radon in Homes, New Study Says, supra note 17.
110. Id. Based upon radon readings in basements, EPA estimated that 20% of the
homes in the United States should have some radon remediation. Id. Based upon her
study, Dr. Harley concluded that approximately seven percent of homes in the United
States may need remediation. In Harley's study, household members in 52 households
in DuPage County, Illinois, wore personal radon monitors (developed specifically for
the study), and radon detectors were placed throughout the house. Participants wore
the monitors at all times for approximately three weeks. Dr. Harley found that the
stationary radon detectors on the first floor recorded the most accurate radon levels in
the house, and that the personal exposure to radon was about 70% of the first floor
readings. Id.
11. Id.
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Notwithstanding the onslaught of criticism concerning its
estimates and projections on the risk of residential radon, EPA remained
firm in its conviction that indoor radon continued to be one of the most
serious health threats in the nation. Although the agency admitted it may
have "garbled" 2 the message on the dangers of 'adon, it reiterated its
firm support in the scientific community for the proposition that indoor
radon poses a serious health threat." 3
Although EPA was probably accurate in noting that the scientific
community was in general agreement on the risks posed by indoor
radon," 4 the agency may not have fully realized the impact that the
criticism of its estimates had on the public perception of radon as a
serious health threat. The hysteria created by its earlier public
warnings... quickly waned. 1 6 Although numerous explanations exist
as to why the indoor radon problem has failed to capture fully the
public's concern,' at least part of the responsibility must be borne by
EPA in its rush to form a judgment on the radon levels which pose
serious health risks.
B. Curing Residential Radon: Testing and Remediation
Although the controversy over the level of indoor radon deemed
112. See Mark Jaffe, Scientists Affirm Threat of Radon, PHILA. INQUIRER, April 3,
1991, at 3-BR.
113. Id.
114. Id.; see also Bookspan, supra note 74, at 365.
115. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
116. As one commentator noted:
In fact, EPA considers dissemination of public information a high
priority and many of EPA's radon-related activities have consisted of
circulating information to the public about radon and radon-reduction
methods. Despite these efforts to inform the public, however, only
about two percent of the nation's homeowners have acted to identify
or correct radon problems. This low response is partly due to the
difficulties in communicating and mitigating radon risks - difficulties
that block the effectiveness of radon-related public information and
awareness campaigns.
Locke, supra note 10, at 10,476 (footnotes omitted).
117. Id. at 12,476-77. Locke lists nine difficulties in communicating the risks of radon
to the public. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 331.
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to pose a health risk contributed to the apparent public apathy which
greeted the residential radon issue less than a decade after its discovery,
the debate over mechanisms and procedures for testing for the presence
of the gas generated even more confusion.
In a pamphlet aimed at educating the public about the dangers of
residential radon, EPA discussed two principal, commercially available
methods to detect the presence of the odorless, colorless, tasteless gas:
the charcoal canister and the alpha track detector."' The charcoal
canister is a device left in the house for a period of three to seven days,
after which it is sent to a laboratory for analysis." 9 The alpha track
detector is exposed to indoor air for at least two to four weeks before
it is sent to a laboratory.2 Both devices have the benefit of being
relatively inexpensive and easy to use. 2' Consequently, citizens
employed these devices most frequently to test for indoor radon.122
Because the charcoal canister test could be completed in a matter of
days, it became thetest of choice for most people who needed or wanted
to test for radon."
EPA recommended that short-term screening devices be used in
the lowest livable area of the home, such as the basement, as a
preliminary test to give the homeowner an idea of the highest radon level
in the home.' 24 If the short-term test indicated a radon reading less
118. A CITIZEN'S GUIDE, supra note 3.
119. See id.; see also Nichols, supra note 8, at 142.
120. A CITIZEN'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 5; see also Nichols, supra note 8, at 142.
As one commentator noted with regard to these testing devices:
Their primary advantages are that they are simple; they are relatively
inexpensive; and they provide averaged measurements over a period
of time. The ability to provide the averaged data is particularly
significant because radon levels often vary significantly from one day
to another and with the seasons.
Prussman, supra note 10, at 723 (footnotes omitted).
121. Prussman, supra note 10, at 723. The charcoal canister device typically costs
from $10 to $25, and the alpha track detector costs from $20 to $50. A CITIZEN'S
GUIDE, supra note 3, at 5; Nichols, supra note 8, at 142.
122. Other testing devices are available, but not generally to the lay person. See A
CITIZEN's GUIDE, supra note 3, at 5; Shepherd, supra note 22, at 48.
123. See Shepherd, supra note 22, at 48.
124. See A CrTzEN's GUIDE, supra note 3, at 6.
RESIDENTIAL RADON CONTAMINATION
than 4 pCi/I, follow-up measurements were "probably not required."'25
When measurements were between 4 pCi/l and 20 pCi/l, EPA
recommended that citizens pursue follow-up measurements. 126 If short-
term measurements revealed radon readings above the 20 pCi/1 level,
EPA urged homeowners to conduct follow-up tests on a more
expeditious basis. 7 EPA further recommended remediation to prevent
indoor radon contamination if follow-up tests, usually tests of much
longer duration,' confirmed these initial radon levels. 9 When the
short-term tests revealed high radon levels, such as 20 pCi/l or above, a
strong probability existed that the follow-up test would indicate at least
a measurable radon reading. Therefore, a strong probability also existed
that the property had sufficient radon contamination to warrant
remediation. 3°  The preliminary readings around the 4 pCi/l range,
however, caused most of the confusion and misinformation.
Although the short-term testing devices, such as the charcoal
canister, were said to be only preliminary devices to give the homeowner
an idea of the highest radon reading in the home,"' this precursory
apparatus instead became, in many instances, the final authority on the
property's radon status. 11 This occurrence became particularly true in
125. Id. at 7.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See also Bannworth, supra note 8, at 177-78.
129. A CIzEN'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 8, 11, 13.
130. Some short-term testing devices were found to give results which were off by
25% or more. See George Lobsenz, Some Home Radon-test Kits Are Inaccurate,
Group Says, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 5, 1989 (Magazine), at I-D. A test reading of 20
pCi/! or more, even if overstated by 50%, would still yield a radon level considered
dangerous by the EPA. See A CITIZEN'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 11.
131. See A CITIZEN'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 6-7.
132. Commentators have noted that radon tests have become crucial to the success of
many residential real estate transactions and that the 4 pCi/l test result has assumed too
much significance in the determination of whether or not a sale will succeed. William
Brodhead, employer of radon-mitigation crews in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania,
stated, "'It's really a real estate problem.' ... 'What's happening is that a lot of real
estate transactions are being determined by a radon screening, but there are actually no
protocols for testing under real estate conditions."' Austin, supra note 16.
Mitchell Finkelstein, President of the Montgomery County Board of Realtors,
said,
"People are getting misinformation and a lot of hype." ... "There has
been very little done in uniformity of testing or in interpretation or the
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the real estate setting where buyers insisted upon a radon test of the
subject property prior to sale. In such transactions, time constraints often
militated against the use of the more accurate, yet more time consuming,
radon detection devices.1
3 3
Once the charcoal canister device became routinely utilized as the
first step in monitoring for indoor radon, its shortcomings started to
become apparent. 4 Because indoor radon levels are a function of
many variables, such as the season of the year and the type of
weather,135 test results, particularly those around the 4 pCi/l range,
validity of the radon scare. It's a situation of the government trying
to do something and screwing it up. EPA hasn't really taken good
leadership." ... "Still, some sales have fallen through because of
radon." ... "It leaves the real estate industry in a very unsteady and
uncomfortable situation."
Id. at 4-H. Brodhead added, "'If the level in your home tests at 4.1 [pCi/l], you might
have trouble selling it."' Id.
133. One commentator noted that, "Despite all the disclaimers by the federal
government, the [4 pCi/l] guideline has become virtual gospel among homeowners, the
real estate industry and professional radon testers, as a safety standard." Purdy, supra
note 47.
134. See Lobsenz, supra note 130. The EPA noted one of the most common
shortcomings of the short-term radon-measuring devices when it stated that,
the screening measurement is not a reliable measure of the average
radon level to which you and your family are exposed. Since radon
levels can vary greatly from season to season as well as from room
to room, the screening measurement only serves to indicate the
potential for a radon problem.
A CITIzEN's GUIDE, supra note 3, at 7 (emphasis in original); see also infra text
accompanying note 140.
135. See Rae Tyson & Tracy Walner, Nationwide Radon Test Urged, USA TODAY,
Oct. 19, 1989, at 8A. EPA recommended that all windows and doors should be closed
during the testing period in order to keep the radon level relatively constant throughout
the testing period. The agency, therefore, suggested that the test be done in the cool
months of the year. Id. at 6. One commentator recommended the cooler months,
preferably winter, to conduct the charcoal canister test because, "The increased
difference in indoor/outdoor air pressure creates an environment in which more radon
is likely to enter the home. Test results are therefore more reliable (and usually
higher)." Clearing The Air, supra note 18, at 30. Other variables which are said to
affect indoor radon readings include rainfall, soil type, vegetation, climate, and
construction quality. See Marc Schogol, Radon Testing, PHILA. INQUIRER, March 20,
1991, at l-D; see also infra note 125 and accompanying text.
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were often unreliable indications of the property's true radon levels. 36
Moreover, once the variables which affect indoor radon readings were
further identified, reports conflicted as to when it was best to test for
radon in order to assure a more accurate result.137 The short-term
136. Lobsenz, supra note 130.
137. While EPA encouraged short-term testing in the cooler months, see A CITIZENS'
GUIDE, supra note 3, at 6, later studies cast doubt on EPA's advice. One study found:
Levels of radon gas in the soil may be as much as 10 times
higher in the summer than in the winter, when most testing for the
cancer-causing gas is done....
Experts say the unusually high seasonal variation raises
questions about the reliability of radon tests in homes and buildings.
The tests are normally conducted in the winter when indoor levels are
believed to be highest.
"Since the radon in houses is derived from soil gas, you
could have relatively high radon concentrations in the summer, when
people least expect it and are least likely to test for it," said Arthur W.
Rose, a geochemistry professor who conducted a study of radon levels
in central Pennsylvania.
Indoor radon levels are thought to be higher in the winter
because windows and doors are kept closed, reducing ventilation that
would otherwise dissipate radon gas and prevent its accumulation to
dangerous levels.
"If they have the house sealed in the summer because of air-
conditioning, the rates in the house might be even higher than in the
winter," Dr. Rose said.
"Mhe study's findings reinforce the belief of many scientists
that one-time or short-term measurements of radon levels in the home
may be misleading," said William J. Fisk, an environmental scientist
at the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory in California.
Although Dr. Rose is unsure of the reason for the seasonal
variation, he said it may be caused by the dryness of the soil in the
summer, which allows the gas to travel more easily.
Higher Radon Levels In Summer Cast Doubt On Reliability of Tests, N.Y. TIMES, May
23, 1989, at C4.
Other studies suggested similar doubts about the reliability of the short-term
radon testing devices:
Rain can sharply increase the level of indoor radon, according to one
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monitoring devices, such as the charcoal canister, often detected
unrepresentative peaks or valleys of radon concentration. 13 Depending
study. A group of researchers from George Mason University in
Fairfax, Va., found that moisture can be the biggest determinant of the
radon level in a house. The moisture traps radon in the soil, so the
radioactive gas accumulates below the house. When the moisture
evaporates, the soil releases the gas in heavy concentrations. The
higher the saturation of moisture in the ground, the heavier the
subsequent emission of radon. Douglas Mose, one of the researchers,
says the findings cast doubt on the validity of federal and state
guidelines for taking radon measurements. He says the guidelines
advise homeowners and potential home buyers who want to check
radon levels in the summer to close the windows of the house
beforehand. The assumption is that radon levels are higher in winter
than in summer, when windows are often open.
But the readings may also be skewed by the level of
precipitation, Mr. Mose says. To be meaningful, he says, the
measurements should be taken in times of relatively normal weather.
Amal Kumar Naj, Rain Stops the Radon -- But Only Temporarily, WALL ST. J., Aug.
29, 1990, at B1.
Other commentators also suggested that EPA's guidelines for testing might
need revision:
Forget those government recommendations for testing your
home for radon in the winter. The theory was that tightly sealed
doors and windows were likely to trap the radioactive gas and
produce the highest readings. But experts have found that many
factors -- such as rainfall, soil type, vegetation, climate and
construction quality -- can cause high indoor radon readings. So
"what you really want to do is test your house two times a year, or
quarterly," advises Daniel J. Greeman, Pennsylvania State University
geologist.
Schogol, supra note 135.
138. Following EPA's 1988 announcement claiming indoor radon as the nation's most
serious air pollution problem, and the subsequent criticism leveled against the popular
charcoal canister testing device, some advertisements for alternative testing devices
stressed the need for continuous monitoring for the most accurate radon readings. One
such advertisement noted:
It is estimated that the average radon level changes as much as 60%
from season to season, while a simple change in the barometric
pressure can change the level of concentration to at least five times
the average level.
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upon the test result, the homeowner was often led to a false sense of fear
or a false sense of security. In addition to the confusion concerning the
proper way to utilize the charcoal canister, many of the laboratories
selling the canisters came under criticism for poor quality control
procedures which lead to erroneous test results.1 39  The consumer
group Public Citizen urged EPA to ask Congress for authorization to
establish a certification program for testing laboratories or mandatory
standards for test kits. 4' Notwithstanding Public Citizen's claim that
three of the nation's seven largest-selling EPA-approved home radon
testing kits did not provide reliable measurements of radon, EPA
declined to seek congressional authority to certify testing
laboratories. 4 ' The unreliability of the short-term charcoal canister test
Long term monitoring of your environment ... will give you
the average level of radon. The typical charcoal canister will only
give the highs and lows from a one or two week period.
Radon Monitoring, Survivor 2.. .Short and Long Term Protection For Your Home
(Advertisement), POPULAR ScI., May 1989, at 69.
139. In late 1988 a Pennsylvania state legislator called for an investigation into the
radon-testing industry. State Senator Michael A. O'Pake, who had earlier sponsored
a law requiring certification for radon firms operating in Pennsylvania, cited a study by
the Patriot-News in Harrisburg that found that wide variations in charcoal-test results
can occur, even when several tests are placed in the same room at the same time. A
Review Sought On Radon Tests, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 1, 1988, at B-14. The Patriot-
News study involved 16 charcoal radon tests produced by eight companies certified by
the state to do radon testing. The tests were conducted at the same time and location
in a house near Harrisburg known to have high levels of radon. The test results issued
by the testing companies differed by as much as 133 %. Senator O'Pake noted, "'I am
troubled by the-fact that properly certified testing firms came up with widely varied
results in the newspaper study ..... '" Id. "'Homeowners are using charcoal testing kits
to make decisions which affect the health of their families ...." Id. "'They need
accurate readings. Homeowners cannot be expected to take the need for testing for
radon seriously when tests yield such a wide variation in readings."' Id.
140. See Radon-Testing Labs Under Question, NEWSDAY, Jan. 5, 1989, at 49.
141. The Ralph Nader-founded Public Citizen consumer group claimed that three of
the seven top-selling radon test kits representing 70% or more of the market, and
approved by the EPA, showed levels of radon as being much higher or not nearly as
high as was actually the case. William Giese, Your Home, Radon-Testing Problems,
CHANGING TIMES, April 1989, at 28-29. As one commentator stated:
EPA approval theoretically means the tests should measure within an
accuracy of 25%. But the approval process wasn't careful enough:
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kits not only resulted in misguided notions of security on the part of
many homeowners concerning indoor radon contamination, but also
contributed to improper decisions on costly remediation, particularly in
real estate sales where time constraints precluded further lengthy, yet
more accurate, testing." Consequently, this unreliability also
furthered the growing distrust and sense of apathy on the part of the
public with regard to the radon issue. 4
Although correcting a residential radon problem did not engender
the controversy which attended the issues of radon health risks and
testing, choosing among the various methods of radon remediation did
present some difficult choices for the homeowner. Because radon levels
can vary from house to house, each diagnosis and cure needs to be
accomplished on a case by case basis.144
EPA's guidelines suggested specific time periods within which
The ... [Public Citizen] tests show that three devices were off by more
than 25% at least once.
Faced with the findings, EPA officials now concede that the
agency muffed its product-testing responsibilities. "he radon-
measuring program was not a perfect program," says former EPA
spokesman Chris Rice. "The EPA should clean up its act."
Id. at 29; see also Lobsenz, supra note 130; Radon-Testing Labs, supra note 140.
142. Many buyers, sellers and real estate professionals do not
understand or take the time to learn how a radon test should be
conducted, the difference between short term and long term tests, the
difference between a screening measurement and follow-up
measurements, what the test results mean and what remedial
construction techniques, if any, should be worked into a home to
correct a problem. Frequently, sellers and buyers incur costs for
improper tests and unnecessary construction expenses, as well as
attorneys' fees to review and redraft sales and lease contracts that
address the perceived risks.
Lee, supra note 16.(
143. A Review Sought On Radon Tests, supra note 139, at 14-B. One commentator
noted that, notwithstanding EPA's efforts to disseminate information to the public about
radon and radon-reduction methods, only about two percent of the nation's homeowners
have acted to identify or correct radon problems. See Locke, supra note 10, at 10,476.
144. See Moore, supra note 8, at 41.
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remediation should take place." Obviously, the higher the preliminary
test readings, the more urgent the need for remedial action. When
preliminary and follow-up tests consistently revealed indoor radon levels
greater than 4 pCi/l, the general assumption was that some efforts should
be made to reduce the indoor radon to as low a level as possible and
practical.'" However, reducing the indoor level to below 4 pCi/l was
the goal.
147
To assist homeowners in understanding their options in reducing
high levels of indoor radon, EPA published a pamphlet outlining the
methodology, cost, effectiveness, limitations and procedures for ten
approaches to reducing indoor radon levels.' Most of the methods
suggested involved either some form of ventilation, sealing of entry
points, or pressurization.19 The effectiveness of each approach
depended upon the particular building's characteristics.' " Fortunately,
145. EPA recommended that for preliminary radon test results greater than 200 pCi/l,
follow-up measurements should be performed as soon as possible. A CrIIzEN's GUIDE,
supra note 3, at 7. Detectors used in the follow-up tests should not be exposed for
'more than a week. If follow-up tests yield the same high readings, PA recommended
taking immediate steps to reduce the level. Id. When initial test readings fell in the
20 pCi/i to 200 pCi/I range, EPA recommended follow-up measurements of no more
than three months duration. Id. If follow-up measurements confirmed the radon levels
of the initial test, EPA recommended remedial action within several months. Id. at 11.
Where initial test results were in the 4 pCi/l to 20 pCi/l range, EPA recommended
follow-up tests of one year duration. Id. at 7. Where follow-up measurements were
in the upper end of this range, EPA recommended remedial action within a few years.
For initial readings less than 4 pCi/l, EPA suggested that follow-up measurements were
not required. Moreover EPA noted that, although radon at these levels do pose health
risks, reduction of levels this low may be difficult, if not impossible. Id. at 11.
146. Id. at 7, 11. The 4 pCi/l came to be the benchmark for safety notwithstanding
the somewhat weak disclaimers of EPA and the critics, such as former Congressman
James Florio from New Jersey, who charged that EPA was spreading an erroneous and
perilous sense of security. See Purdy supra note 47, at 4-A; see also supra notes 94-
97 and accompanying text.
147. A CITzEN's GUIDE, supra note 3, at 11.
148. See U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, Pub. No. OPA-87-010, RADON
REDUCTION METHODS, A HOMEOWNER'S GUIDE (2d ed.) (1987) [hereinafter RADON
REDUCTION METHODS].
149. Id. EPA also mentions the technique for reducing radon known as "air cleaning"
but does not endorse the use of air cleaners because "this technology has not been
demonstrated to be effective in reducing the health risks associated with radon." Id. at
4. See Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 701-02 for a detailed discussion of air
cleaners.
150. See CROSS supra note 22, at 17.
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virtually every structure contaminated with indoor radon is deemed to be
remediable."' The New Jersey Environmental Protection
Commissioner, in fact, declared that "'virtually any house or building can
be cleansed. of potentially dangerous indoor levels of [radon] through
sophisticated ventilation and sealing techniques."""' The costs for the
various methods suggested ranged from approximately $100 to $2500,
depending upon the complexity of the technique utilized. ' Average
costs per home were said to be in the $1000 range.' 54
Because these remediation costs were relatively modest when
compared to the health risks suggested by EPA, and because the
remediation procedures appeared to make a major impact on reducing
radon levels, the stumbling block in the remediation process concerned,
once again, the genuineness of the necessity to remedy and the
qualifications of the those who performed the remedial work. The
genuineness of the necessity to remedy was bound up with the
controversy over the level of radon which poses health risks55 and the
testing devices, particularly the short-term testing devices which came
under attack so frequently.'56 Even if a homeowner subscribed to
EPA's position that an indoor radon reading in the 4 pCi/l to 20 pCi/l
range posed substantial health risks'57 and the homeowner were
convinced that tests performed on the property were reliable, the decision
to spend up to $2500 to reduce the radon level was apparently not one
easily made.' Even EPA's advice on the urgency to remedy in this
range was lukewarm at best: "We recommend that you take action
within a few years, sooner if levels are at the upper end of this
range."159
151. Id. (footnote omitted).
152. Id. (alteration in original).
153. See RADON REDUCTION METHODS, supra note 148, at 4-17. Estimates for
remedial work sometimes range as high as $5000. See Cross & Murray, supra note 10,
at 701 n.99.
154. See Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 701 n.99.
155. See supra notes 103-17 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 145-54 and accompanying text.
157. See A CITIZEN'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 8-10.
158. One study revealed that of approximately 41% of households estimated to have
indoor radon levels in excess of 4 pCi/l, less than one percent undertook mitigation
procedures despite an awareness campaign and the availability of reduced-price testing
kits made to the sample households within the study group. See Locke, supra note 10,
at 10,478.
159. A CITIZEN'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 11.
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Although the concern with the qualifications of those who
perform radon mitigation services was somewhat assuaged for some
homeowners whose state government had certification programs for
radon measurement and mitigation, 60 many homeowners were left to
heed EPA's advice:
We cannot overemphasize the importance of carefully
selecting a contractor and reviewing any proposal for
radon reduction work at your house. Asking for business
references and checking with your local Better Business
Bureau or Chamber of Commerce will help you ensure
that a contractor is reputable. Many states will provide
lists of contractors doing radon mitigation work, and some
states have certification programs for radon measurement
and mitigation. 6'
Moreover, EPA's dramatic 1988 announcement about the dangers
of residential radon6 sparked a surge in businesses dealing with the
issue of indoor radon.'63 Obviously, in the absence of governmental
controls in many states, the field was wide open for fraud and
scams.'" In addition, EPA's announcement created a panic for some
homeowners in those geographic areas where radon is more likely to
160. See RADON REDUCTION METHODS, supra note 148, at 1; see also Bannworth,
supra note 8, at 178 n.76 (explaining New Jersey's approach to certifying radon
mitigation firms).
161. RADON REDUCTION METHODS, supra note 148, at 1.
162. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
163. See Jonathan P. Hicks, US. Report Helps Radon-Test Companies, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 1988, at DI.
164. A publication of the American Association of Retired Persons warned of one such
scam:
Take steps to protect yourself. While there are hundreds of ruses
going around, many are variations on a theme. Be aware of the most
common: The radon test scheme. An individual claiming to be a
"radon inspector" proposes to hang small sacks around your home that
will test for radiation. After the sacks "detect" the alleged radiation,
the inspector calls in a colleague who, for a fee, offers to "purge"
your property of the unwanted radon. The operation is likely a scam.
Recognizing Con Games, AARP BULLETIN, Feb. 1991, at 16.
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occur. Homeowners were concerned that obvious evidence of
remediation of their homes would stigmatize the property and have a
deleterious impact on property value. 6  Consequently, many
homeowners chose not to remedy indoor radon unless they were required
to do so pursuant to the contractual terms of an agreement for the sale
of their home.'"
The confusion surrounding the radon issue was often grounded
upon the vagaries of the levels of exposure deemed to pose health risks
as well as the reliability of the testing and remediation processes.
However, EPA's risk estimates for developing lung cancer from indoor
radon were premised on a person spending seventy-five percent of her
time at home and being exposed in the home for roughly seventy years.
These presumptions did little to inspire the homeowner to take remedial
action. Even EPA cautioned that,
[t]he risk estimates ... are based on the assumption that
you will be exposed to the radon level found in your
home for roughly 70 years. As you evaluate your
potential risk, therefore, you might consider the total
amount of time you expect to live in your home.167
Clearly, the American public was not prepared to invest in a cause,
though seemingly worthy, with so many uncertainties.
165. As one commentator noted with regard to a radon mitigation company:
The radon-mitigation crews employed by William Brodhead work in
unmarked trucks, so neighbors aren't aware of what the workers are
doing when the trucks are parked outside a client's home .... It's
really a real estate problem .... What's happening is that a lot of real
estate transactions are being determined by a radon screening but
there are actually no protocols for testing under real estate conditions.
Austin, supra note 16.
166. See Locke, supra note 10, at 10,479 ("Presented in the home sale context, both
the home seller's and home buyer's apathy about radon's hazards can be transformed
into self-protective action, thereby eliminating most of the problems associated with
communicating radon risk and encouraging remediation.").
167. A CITIZEN'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 12.
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II. THE RADON PROBLEM AND THE LAW
The ten years since the dramatic discovery of high levels of
naturally occurring indoor radon in the Watras house have witnessed the
development of a confusing, sometimes contradictory, public policy at
the federal government level sporadic attention at the state government
level, and the virtual lack of intervention by the courts. Because the
American public continues to display a lack of interest in the issue of
indoor radon after ten years of publicity about the significant health
hazards which attend long-term exposure to the gas, the federal
government, through both legislative and administrative efforts, has had
to shoulder the lion's share of responsibility. Federal public policy on
naturally occurring indoor radon primarily has taken the form of research
gathering, testing and the dissemination of information to the public."'
As one commentator noted:
Given the magnitude of the cancer risk from indoor radon,
which apparently exceeds all outdoor pollutants combined,
one might expect government control action. To date,
however, government has done relatively little, There is
virtually no direct regulation of the indoor radon problem,
and little other government action. Most disturbingly,
indoor radon appears to have a very low priority with
government health and safety agencies, despite
protestations to the contrary. In addition, "the legislative
and regulatory framework for radon has been characterized
by ambiguity and controversy about whether particular
agencies have the responsibility and authority to address
the problem." 6'
168. See Jaffe, supra note 19, at 1-C.
169. CROSS, supra note 22, at 77 (quoting SHELDON KPJMSKY & ALONZO PLOUOH,
ENVIRONMENTAL HAzARDs: COMMUNICATINo RISKS AS A SOCIAL PROCESS 142
(1988)) (footnote omitted).
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A. Radon and Public Policy
I. Federal Responses to Radon Contamination
In early 1985, following the December 1984 discovery of
extremely high levels of naturally occurring radon in the Watras house,
EPA recognized that indoor radon may be a widespread
phenomenon.17 Consequently, in September 1985, EPA established the
Radon Action Program, which focused on discovering the extent of the
indoor radon dilemma, reducing exposure to radon in existing homes and
preventing radon from entering new construction. '71 Pursuant to the
Radon Action Program, EPA developed the State Radon Survey Program
to assist states in conducting statewide radon surveys.172 In addition,
EPA developed and demonstrated cost-effective mitigation methods to
reduce levels of indoor radon in existing homes as well as in new
construction.173 Under the Radon Action Program, EPA also sought
to provide the states with the technical assistance necessary to become
self-sufficient in managing the radon problem.' 74 Moreover, EPA
published several brochures on radon in an effort to inform the public of
the dangers related to the indoor gas, the methods for testing for radon
and the techniques for reducing indoor radon levels. 75 Finally, the
170. Id. By 1980, the General Accounting Office, a research branch of Congress, had
gathered a considerable amount of evidence regarding the hazard posed by indoor
radon. Even then, it was estimated that indoor radon could be responsible for as many
as 20,000 deaths annually. Id. at 77-78.
171. See Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 337.
172. Id. at 338.
173. Id. at 339.
174. Id. EPA's aim was to give technical advice to the states instead of performing
the task for the states. Id. EPA also implemented the Radon Proficiency Measurement
program to assist the development of private industry involved in radon measurement.
Id. at 340.
175. See, e.g., A CITZEN's GUIDE, supra note 3; RADON REDUCTION METHODS, supra
note 148. A CITIZEN'S GUIDE became for many the source of the accepted position on
numerous issues related to radon which were in reality not well-settled. For example,
EPA's recommendation with regard to the 4 pCi/1 as the action level at which a
homeowner should consider remediation of the home for indoor radon was a
controversial one. See supra text accompanying notes 75-103. Moreover, EPA's
recommendation for testing using a short-term charcoal canister testing device placed
in the lowest livable area of the home became accepted protocol for testing.
Notwithstanding much controversy surrounding the accuracy of such short-term tests.
See supra text accompanying notes 115-39; see also infra text accompanying notes
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Radon Action Program coordinated various federal agencies that were
similarly interested in the problems associated with indoor radon, such
as the United States Department of Energy and the United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development' 7'
Congress' first and most significant response to the indoor radon
problem came with the passage of the Radon Gas and Indoor Air Quality
Research Act of 1986 ("The Research Act").' Although The
Research Act increased the level of attention given to the indoor radon
problem, the statute's primary thrust was to authorize further research on
the issue of indoor radon.'' In fact, Congress quite specifically
provided that The Research Act not be "construed to authorize the
Administrator to carry out any regulatory program or any activity other
than research, development, and related reporting, information
dissemination, and coordination activities specified in this title." 79
Perhaps the most significant statement made by Congress
concerning the indoor radon dilemma has been in the Indoor Radon
Abatement Act of 1988 ("The Abatement Act"). 80 Among the law's
major provisions are: the establishment of a national goal of reducing
indoor radon concentrations significantly below the heretofore routinely
accepted 4 pCi/l guideline"'. and the authorization of up to $10 million
for grants to state radon programs," 2 $1.5 million for the study of
radon in schools,"' $1.5 million for regulating radon testing and
192-206. Ultimately, the controversy which many of EPA's recommendations
engendered resulted in fostering the apathy with which the radon issue was greeted
during the late 1980s and beyond. See Locke supra note 10, at 10,476. EPA
acknowledged the public apathy at the time it released its revised edition of A
CrnzEN's GUIDE in 1992. See U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PUB. No. 400-R-92-
011, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT FOR THE 1992 CInzEN's GUIDE TO RADON 6-1
(1992) [hereinafter TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT]; see also infra note 183.
176. Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 340 (detailing discussion of the coordination efforts
among various federal agencies concerning radon issues).
177. Radon Gas and Indoor Air Quality Research Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1758 (1986), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 7401 note (1988).
178. See CRoss, supra note 22, at 82.
179. The Research Act § 404, reprinted in 42 U.S.C § 7401 note (1988); see Moore,
supra note 8, at 44-47 (discussing in detail The Research Act).
180. Pub. L. No. 100-551, 102 Stat. 2755 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2661-
2671 (1988 & Supp. 11 1992); see also Nichols, supra note 8, at 161.
181. See The Abatement Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 2661.
182. Id. § 306(j), 15 U.S.C. § 2666(j).
183. Id. § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 2667.
19931
144 WM. & MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 18:107
mitigation firms,"' $1 million for regional training centers at
universities' and $3 million for technical assistance in radon testing
and mitigation." 6 The Abatement Act also authorized federal agencies
to study their own buildings for radon contamination'" and allowed
EPA to develop and promote model construction standards to avoid
excessive indoor radon." 8  The House Committee on Energy and
Commerce emphasized that the development of model construction
standards and the goal of reducing indoor radon levels below the 4 pCi/i
guideline do "'not ... create a legal cause of action for any building
occupant, building purchaser, or member of the public against building
owners, real estate professionals, lenders, or builders."'"
One commentator likened The Abatement Act to its predecessors:
[T]his bill does more to recognize the problem than to
solve it. The Radon Abatement Act provides no
regulatory authority to protect building occupants and the
amounts of money authorized for. indoor radon research
and control are insignificant. Congress failed to
184. Id. § 305(e), 15 U.S.C. 2665(e).
185. Id. § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 2668.
186. Id. § 305, 15 U.S.C. § 2665.
187. Id. § 309, 15 U.S.C. § 2669.
188. Id. § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 2664.
189. Nichols, supra note 8, at 162 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1047, 102d Cong., 2d Sess
11, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3617). One commentator noted with regard to
the model construction standards:
These standards or guidelines could become mandatory for all new
home construction or existing homes upon transfer by either state or
local legislative and regulatory actions. Also, because of the potential
liability faced by builders and sellers of homes, attorneys often
counsel these clients to incorporate radon construction techniques into
all their homes. The problem with all of this is that if construction
standards are incorporated into every hew home, we create a situation
where we will "fix" 100 percent of new housing when, according to
even EPA figures, only 10 percent of homes nationwide have a radon
problem. The other 90 percent of new home buyers will then incur
expenses to address a nonexistent health risk. Misinformation about
this natural substance and liability fears are driving us toward an
irrational fear.
Lee, supra note 16, at 38.
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appropriate funds for many of the programs contained in
the law." °
Through The Abatement Act, however, Congress did recognize
that EPA had, primarily through its publication of A CrrEN's GUIDE,
oversimplified the testing procedures for radon as well as the risks
associated with various radon levels, particularly the 4 pCi/l
guideline. 9' Thus, Congress explicitly directed EPA to rewrite A
CITIZEN's GUIDE.' 92 Clearly, Congress recognized that the public was
laboring under major misconceptions regarding the radon dilemma, most
of which were fostered by EPA through A CITIZEN's GUIDE."93
In May 1992, EPA issued the second edition of A CITIZEN's
GUIDE ("CIZEN's GUIDE, 2D ED.").'" At the time CrzEN's GUIDE,
2D ED., was issued, EPA acknowledged that the first version served as
the core policy statement, the primary public information brochure and
the federal government's principal guidance document on indoor
radon."" However, at the time of the second edition, EPA sought to
distance itself from the shortcomings of the original brochure by
explaining that it was based upon limited experience with homes whose
indoor radon problems resulted from uranium mill tailings'96 and that
research in these homes revealed that most could be mitigated
consistently to an average indoor radon level of 4 pCi/l."7
Consequently, "EPA established 4 pCi/i as the action level at which
people should fix their homes.""' Moreover, EPA explained that its
190. CRoss, supra note 22, at 83.
191. Nichols, supra note 8, at 163-66. In requiring that EPA revise A CrnzEN's
GUIDE, Congress was concerned that the short-term radon test results may not be
accurate. Id. at 163 n.168. Congress was also concerned that many homeowners
misinterpreted EPA's action level of 4 pCi/l as suggesting that there is little or no
health risks at that level. Id. at 164 nn.173 & 178.
192. The Abatement Act § 303(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2663(a).
193. Former Congressman James J. Florio (D., N.J.) charged EPA with making a
virtually fraudulent representation with its 4 pCi/l action level. Florio maintained that
the 4 pCi/I standard kills people. See Purdy, supra note 47, at 4-A.
194. U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY ET AL., PUB. Nos. ANR-464, 402-K92-001,
A CrIzEN's GUIDE To RADON: THE GUIDE To PROTECTING YOURSELF AND YOUR
FAMILY FROM RADON (2d ed. 1992) [hereinafter CTzEN's GUIDE, 2D ED.].
195. See TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 175, at 1-1.
196. See id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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earlier, testing protocols, which suggested short-term tests, such as the
charcoal canister,' to establish a worst-case radon level, were based
upon very limited information on the relationship between short-term and
annual radon concentrations.20
EPA's stand on both the 4 pCi/l action level and the protocol for
short-term testing led not only to the unfounded establishment of the 4
pCi/i as the threshold value between safe and unsafe indoor radon levels,
but also caused short-term testing using the controversial charcoal
canister to become, in many instances, the single determinant of whether
or not a property needed radon remediation.2°' Furthermore, while
EPA suggested that A CiTIZEN's GUIDE was prepared in a manner geared
to avoid public panic, 2 2 EPA's subsequent announcement in 1988 on
the dangers of radon 2 3 did little to avoid an initial overreaction by the
public. Of even greater concern was that the public began to rely on the
recommendations of A CITIZEN'S GUIDE,20 4 many of which EPA later
came to disavow.20 ' While EPA recognized in 1992 that the public
perceived the issue of indoor radon with apathy,20 6 it was not, as EPA
suggested, the "factual and informative ,21 tone of A C E's GUIDE
199. See supra notes 126-45 and accompanying text.
200. See TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 175, at 1-1, 3-1.
201. During congressional hearings on The Abatement Act, concern was expressed that
many people have misinterpreted EPA's designated action level of 4 pCi/l as meaning
that there is little or no health risk at that level. Moreover, there was concern that
instantaneous or short-term radon test results may not indicate reliable long-term radon
levels and that homeowners may, in reliance upon inaccurate test results, not pursue
radon mitigation. See Nichols, supra note 8, at, 135, 163 n.168, 164 n.173. Where
radon was a concern in a real estate transaction, the reliance upon the 4 pCi/l action
level was often perfunctory:
"If it's below 4 [pCi/l], most people believe they're safe and clear,"
said Harold Stesis, president of the U.S. Toxic Substance Testing
Bureau, a Philadelphia-based company that conducts radon testing
nationwide. "If you try to give advice that's not in accordance with
the EPA, you're really putting your neck on the line."
Purdy, supra note 47, at 4-A.
202. See TEcHNICAL REPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 175, at 6-1.
203. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
204. See Purdy, supra note 47, at 4-A.
205. See TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 175, at 1-1, 1-2, 3-1, 3-2.
206. Id. at 6-1.
207. Id.
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which caused the torpid response. Rather, it was A CITIZEN'S GUIDE's
oversimplification of the indoor radon issue,2 ' coupled with its
recommendations which were unsupported by appropriate scientific
studies0 9  and the subsequent controversy over many of its
suggestions" ° that provided much of the rationale for the public's
eventual failure to respond to the residential radon issue.
The absence of any other significant radon legislation
demonstrates that the federal government chose to remain a catalyst on
the issue of naturally occurring indoor radon, and not be the principal
agent of change. Notwithstanding the reaffirmation of the dangers of
residential radon in its CrrIzEN's GUIDE, 2D ED., the federal government,
through EPA, seemed content with developing data about radon dangers,
targeting high risk areas, providing information to the public' and
regulating the industries that test and mitigate."' Furthermore, as one
commentator noted: "So long as Congress denies explicit regulatory
authority to EPA and other agencies, there can be no comprehensive,
effective federal program of radon control. The provision of regulatory
authority appears highly unlikely, as legislators are concerned about the
costs regulation might impose on the construction industry and
homeowners."' 3
208. See supra notes 88-120 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 88-102, 125-132 and accompanying text. See generally
LEONARD A. COLE, ELEMENT OF RISK: THE POLITCS OF RADON (1993) (challenging
EPA's recommendation that every house in the United States should be tested for
radon).
211. When it became clear that the public was not responding to the governmental
warnings about radon, EPA enlisted the services of the Advertising Council. See
Purdy, Officials Renew Call For Radon Testing, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 19, 1989, at 3-
A.
212. See Jaffe, supra note 19.
213. CROSS, supra note 22, at 84. While the federal government's decision not to
regulate the radon problem has been controversial, some commentators have noted that
Congress has not granted EPA authority to regulate in this field. Id. at 78. Although
statutes such as the Clean Air Act, which gives EPA the authority to regulate air
pollutants entering the "ambient air," have been suggested as authority for regulating
indoor radon, EPA has interpreted this authority as limited to outdoor air. Id. at 79; see
generally Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988 &
Supp. III 1991); see also Moore, supra note 8, at 42-44 (discussing the application of
the Clean Air Act and the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083
(1988 & Supp. I 1990), to the indoor radon problem).
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2. States Responses to Radon Contamination
The federal public policy on indoor radon made clear that the
federal government was not prepared to assume regulatory functions.
Most of the federal public policy merely provided for assistance to the
states in developing radon programs. Consequently, much of the real
effort to deal with the residential radon issue has taken place at the state
level.
Radon rich soils are not found equally throughout the United
States.21 4 Thus, state initiatives to deal with indoor radon vary from
state to state. The states where radon levels have been found to be
highest have established the most sophisticated state programs to deal
with the issue.2" The states of New Jersey, Florida, Maine,
Pennsylvania and New York, where radon surveys have confirmed high
radon levels, are among those that have made the greatest efforts to deal
with the issue.21 ' Although each of these states has instituted its own
specific approach to treat the radon dilemma, the programs nonetheless
share some common elements." 7 These states have, to one extent or
another, engaged in surveying for radon levels, setting standards for
testing and remediation, establishing loan programs for remediation,
disseminating information to the public and formulating
recommendations for reducing radon in new construction. 18 Also,
each of the states with an operational program has established
laboratories to analyze the results of the tests.21
9
New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania account for eighty-eight
percent of all state radon funding.22 Pennsylvania used some of its
funding to offer free radon testing devices to the public
221 whereas
New Jersey conducted epidemiologic studies to examine the link between
radon and cancer.222 Thus, the states vary somewhat as to what
specific programs they fund.
Perhaps the most significant common traits among the states with
214. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
215. See Moore, supra note 8, at 50-59.
216. See Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 349.
217. See Moore, supra note 8, at 51.
218. See id.
219. See Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 351.
220. See id at 350.
221. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 8, at 52.
222. Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 352; see Moore, supra note 8, at 52.
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advanced radon programs, however, have been their efforts to increase
public awareness about the health risks associated with indoor radon2
and their efforts to protect consumers from unscrupulous testing and
remediation contractors.224
The majority of states have acknowledged that the radon problem
could pose a health risk for their citizens, but have not gotten beyond
rudimentary organizational efforts to establish a radon program. 22"
Often, these states were not sure whether radon is actually a significant
health risk to their citizenry.226 Some states with developing programs
typically had initiated or completed surveys to determine the extent of
the radon problem in the state.227
A small number of states have virtually ignored the radon issue.
"These states have not yet perceived that they have a radon problem and
thus do not have plans to develop a program until future evidence reveals
the need for such a program."" In these states public awareness of
radon remains minimal.229
Because federal public policy concerning the radon issue assumes
that the radon problem is primarily a matter of local concern, 23 0 federal
legislation and EPA efforts have not gone much beyond information
gathering and public education."' This has left the states with the
responsibility of determining how to deal with the issue. Except for
those relatively few states where radon has been shown to be a
significant indoor pollutant, the states have remained quite passive in
223. See Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 353. The states with operational programs have
made frequent use of EPA-published brochures, A CrIzEN's GUIDE and RADON
REDUCnON METHODS, in educating their citizens about the dangers of indoor radon.
Id.
224. See Moore, supra note 8, at 53-54. New Jersey took the lead in protecting its
citizens from unqualified radon contractors by enacting legislation which requires the
state's Department of Environmental Protection to establish a program for certification
of radon testers. Id.; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2D-70, -71.
225. See Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 345-47. EPA categorizes the states into four
levels: Level I (states with informational programs); Level II (states with formative
programs); Level m (states with developing programs); and Level IV (states with
operational programs). Id. at 345-54.
226. Id at 345.
227. Id. at 347.
228. Id. at 345.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 344.
231. See supra notes 160-202 and accompanying text.
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their response to the radon dilemma. 2 Even those states with
operational radon programs have generally not acted to regulate the radon
problem through mandatory testing and remediation." 3 Because both
federal and state public policy on radon primarily stressed information-
gathering, research and public education, many commentators believed
that the courts would eventually define the responsibilities of
homeowners with regard to the indoor radon issue.
B. Radon and the Courts
Shortly after the discovery of extremely high levels of naturally
occurring radon in the Watras house,24 many commentators began to
speculate about the surge of litigation which they predicted was
imminent.2" Some commentators even suggested that a litigation surge
involving naturally occurring indoor radon had begun, 6
notwithstanding the virtual lack of such lawsuits filed at the time these
proclamations were made." In preparation, numerous commentators
reviewed and analyzed the legal theories upon which lawsuits would be
232. See CROSS, supra note 22, at 87. Among the states with operational radon
programs, New Jersey took an early lead. Through legislative enactment it gave its
Department of Environmental Protection authority to survey the state to determine the
extent of radon contamination, established a certification program for radon testers and
mitigation firms, provided for a public information and education program, required
disclosure of radon test results to prospective buyers, when radon tests had already been
performed, and provided for the adoption of radon-resistant construction standards with
regard to new home and school construction. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2D-59-80,
52:27D-123a to -123e (West 1987 & Supp. 1993).
233. See generally Bannworth, supra note 8, at 181 n.103.
234. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
235. Galen, supra note 2, at 1.
236. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., Bannworth, supra note 8, 181 n.103 (1991) (reporting that, as of the
writing of the note, there were no reported decisions in New Jersey arising out of issues
related to naturally occurring radon). In early 1991, however, a New Jersey court ruled
on a breach of contract case involving a purchaser's refusal to perform the purchase
contract on a home which had a radon reading of 2.9 pCi/I pursuant to a three-day test.
The court found the purchaser's refusal to perform the purchase contract due to a radon
level of 2.9 pCi/l was objectively unreasonable and did not justify the breach. Wong
v. Mercado, 590 A.2d 723 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
150
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brought."5
The onslaught of radon-based litigation, however, has not
materialized. Although the radon finding at the Watras house was a
watershed -- a discovery that should have dramatically changed the fact
that Americans view their homes as safe and secure havens from the ills
of the outside world -- the radon issue instead is all but ignored by the
public just ten years after its discovery. While there are numerous
reasons to explain the public's apathy,239 the failure of the anticipated
litigation explosion to date is certainly a positive result. Commentators
who analyzed the anticipated lawsuits, however, have provided a resource
of analyses concerning the indoor radon issue which will prove beneficial
should the litigation surge become a reality.
As the public policy related to naturally occurring indoor radon
contamination is primarily research and education oriented, rather than
regulatory, the anticipated bases for recovery are common law theories.
Most commentators predicted that litigation would most likely arise in
the context of the sale of real property. They listed probable defendants
to include homeowners, builders, real estate agents, developers,
surveyors, architects, engineers, landlords, radon testers and remediation
contractors, carpenters, plumbers, suppliers of fill, manufacturers of
concrete slabs, private house inspectors, ventilation contractors, utilities
that encourage weatherization, and repair persons. 40
Although the theories of recovery suggested by commentators are
many and varied, there has been a decided convergence of opinion on the
efficacy of two bases for recovery: (1) the implied warranty of
habitability and (2) strict liability. 24' Other theories of recovery
238. See, e.g., Shuko, supra note 22, at 369-88; Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at
702-24; Dearing, supra note 8, at 830-46. The uranium mill tailing cases, which
involve radon contamination resulting from the uranium milling process, are among the
few cases involving radon contamination. The precedential value of these cases is
limited since the radon contamination in homes built on top of the mill tailings is not
considered to be naturally occurring. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
239. See infra note 314 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 7; Shepherd & Gaynor, supra note 8, at 8; Shuko,
supra note 22, at 369.
241. Although commentators routinely noted that no clear-cut liability yet exists under
any established common law theory, some have suggested that: "In some respects,
strict liability offers the most promise for homeowners exposed to excessive indoor
radon levels.". Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 703. The greater weight of opinion,
however, apparently found the implied warranty of habitability to provide the strongest
basis for recovery. See, e.g., Shuko, supra note 22, at 369 ("[O]nly the implied
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suggested include negligence,2 2  fraud243  and violation of the
constitutional right to privacy. 44
1. Implied Warranty of Habitability
The implied warranty of workmanlike construction and
habitability holds that the builder-vendor of a home impliedly warrants
that the home is built in a workmanlike manner and is reasonably fit for
the purpose for which it is sold.245 Homeowners who discover indoor
radon could argue, therefore, that the radon contamination renders the
home unfit for human habitation. The implied warranty theory makes
litigation easier for the homeowner because it does not require that the
homeowner show fault on the part of the seller.
2
"
The warranty, however, does not blindly make the builder liable
for any and all defects in the house. 47 A reasonableness test is applied
to the level of workmanship and the duration of the warranty.
48
Where radon contamination can be linked to faulty construction, such as
cracks in foundations which give radon gas an easy entry, the application
of the warranty to a homeowner's lawsuit seems clear.
2 49 Unlike
negligence, the lack of foreseeability of a radon problem does not bar the
warranty of habitability may provide a legally adequate means of relief for the
aggrieved party."); Dearing, supra note 8 ("[Tlhe implied warranty approach will
probably prove to be the most effective cause of action in the area of radon gas
litigation."); Conaway, supra note 10, at 46 ("The policy considerations and purposes
of the implied warranty of habitability appear to make its extension to the radon
pollution context appropriate.").
242. See, e.g., Conaway, supra note 10, at 38-43.
243. See, e.g., Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 722-24.
244. See Bannworth, supra note 8, at 184-86. The author raises constitutional right
to privacy issues with regard to laws which require state certified radon testers and
mitigators to supply names, addresses and radon test results to government agencies.
Id. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2D-74 (West 1987).
245. See Waltz, supra note 10, at 1119; Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 207 A.2d 314, 327
(N.J. 1965) (stating that a real estate developer warrants that the home he sells is "built
in a workmanlike manner and is suitable for habitation").
246. See Waltz, supra note 10, at 1119.
247. Id. at 1121.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1123-25; see also Nobel v. Marvin E. Kanze, No. 83-05253 (Montgomery
Co., PA, C.C.P. Civ. Div. filed April 13, 1983) (cited in Galen, supra note 2, at 8)
(suing a component's supplier for breach of implied warranty because an air
conditioning-heating device caused homeowner to have a radon problem).
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use of the warranty by the homeowner." 0 As one commentator noted:
"If given the present knowledge of the radon problem, a reasonable
builder did not use certain building methods or materials when
constructing a home in a radon prone area, it may be seen as a breach of
workmanlike construction."251
Most jurisdictions recognize some form of the implied warranty
of habitability; however, the level of workmanship which the builder is
held to warrant is not consistent among the jurisdictions. 2  While
some courts hold that the warranty guarantees that the home will have
no defects that substantially impair the enjoyment of the home, other
courts apply the warranty only when the home is virtually
uninhabitable.5 3 Other potential limitations to the warranty's use and
effectiveness include: the requirement for a timely notice from the buyer
to the builder-vendor notifying him of the defect, an opportunity for the
builder-vendor to correct the defect and contract disclaimers of the
warranty which are clearly and conspicuously stated.254 Moreover,
because the implied warranty of habitability is essentially contract-based
in origin," its application may require a showing of privity of
contract."6 These limitations have prompted some to suggest that strict
liability offers the most promise for the homeowner with an indoor radon
problem because strict liability appears to offer most of the benefits of
the implied warranty without many of the drawbacks.257
250. See Waltz, supra note 10, at 1124. Implied warranty theory is derived from
products liability cases where there is no requirement of foreseeability of the harm to
impose liability on the seller. Id. at 1126.
251. Id. at 1127. Faulty construction may not be the only exposure to liability faced
by the builder. Some cases involving residential real estate have extended implied
warranties to site location as well. See, e.g., Degnan v. Executive Homes, 696 P.2d
431 (Mont. 1985) (bringing action for breach of implied warranty of habitability when
ground instability caused structural damage to the houses).
252. See Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 716.
253. Id. at 716-17.
254. Id. at 716-18.
255. Id. at 715.
256. Id. at 717. Although privity is still the majority rule, there is a growing trend to
abandon or limit the privity requirement in implied warranty cases. Id.
257. Id. at 703.
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2. Strict Liability
Like the implied warranty of habitability, the strict liability theory
is attractive because the plaintiff need not prove fault on the part of the
seller.2"8 Although the tort concept of strict liability has been applied
in many contexts, it is most notably utilized in the products liability
context.2" 9 However, the use of a strict liability rationale to hold a
builder-vendor liable for damages caused by a house is not without
precedent. In the 1965 landmark decision Schipper v. Levitt & Sons,2"
the New Jersey Supreme Court found the developer of mass produced
houses strictly liable for injuries sustained by a child who suffered bums
as a result of a defective water heater. The court in Schipper also held
that a builder impliedly warrants that the house he sells is "built in a
workmanlike manner and is suitable for habitation. "261  Since the
court's decision in Schipper, many courts have adopted the same
reasoning to hold developers liable for real property defects on either a
strict liability in tort theory262 or contract-based implied warranty of
habitability rationale.263
The court in Schipper premised its decision on a number of policy
considerations including the unequal bargaining position of the
homeowner in relation to the builder, the reliance by the homeowner on
the builder's expertise, deep pocket considerations and risk spreading,
and the buyer's relative inability to protect herself.2' In order to
recover under a strict liability theory, the plaintiff must establish that the
258. See Dearing, supra note 8, at 830.
259. See Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 703. In certain instances a home may be
found to be a product. Id. See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 207 A.2d 314 (N.J.
1965); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., 154 N.W.2d 803 (S.D. 1967); Wayne v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, 730 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159
(1985).
260. 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965).
261. Id. at 327 (quoting Carpenter V. Donohoe, 388 P.2d 399, 402 (Colo. 1964)).
262. See, e.g., Patitucci V. Drelich, 379 A.2d 297 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977);
Gay v. Cornwall, 494 P.2d 1371 (Wash. Ct. App. 1972); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes,
74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969).
263. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 175 S.E.2d 792 (S.C. 1970); Gable v. Silver,
258 So.2d 11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). The court in Schipper referred to the theories
of strict liability and implied warranty interchangeably in its analysis. Schipper 207
A.2d at 325; Raymond A. Pagliari, Comment, Strict Tort Liability To The Builder
Vendor Of Homes: Schipper And Beyond?, 10 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 103, 106 (1983).
264. Schipper, 207 A.2d at 325-26.
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product (in the radon context, a home) was in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user.26 The defective condition of the
product may be established by: (1) a flaw in the product that was
present at the time it was sold by the defendant; (2) a failure by the
manufacturer to warn adequately of a risk or hazard related to product
design; or (3) a defective design of the product.266
While noting that the application of strict liability theory to the
homeowners' suit against the builder-vendor for indoor radon
contamination seems logical, some commentators observed that the
application would, nonetheless, face certain obstacles. As one
commentator noted:
The perfect [indoor radon] case for strict liability under
prevailing principles would be one where: (1) the builder-
vendor was engaged in mass production sales; (2) radon
entered the house primarily through cracks in a faultily
constructed basement; (3) the sale took place recently; and
(4) indoor radon levels substantially exceeded applicable
standards.2 67
The above suggested best-case scenario is premised upon the
following. First, the facts of Schipper dealt with a builder engaged in the
mass production of houses. It is not clear that the court's policy
justifications would or should apply to small or custom builders.26
Second, the plaintiffs injury in Schipper was caused by a defective
product (a water heater) and not simply a naturally occurring
phenomenon such as radon. It is possible for a house to become
contaminated with radon using state-of-the-art construction without any
design or manufacturing defect.269 Third, the indoor radon hazard is
a relatively recent discovery. It was not until the finding of high levels
of indoor radon in late 1984 at the Watras house that EPA and the media
began to publicize the possibility of dangerous levels of naturally
265. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
266. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99 (1)-(3) (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
267. See Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 714. For a detailed analysis supporting
the commentators' suggested perfect case for the application of strict liability to a radon
lawsuit, see id at 708-15.
268. Id. at 706-08.
269. Id. at 711-14.
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occurring radon accumulating indoors. 7° Finally, the levels at which
indoor radon poses substantial health risks is clearly not a well-settled
issue. Obviously, the higher the radon level in the home, the greater the
consensus in the scientific community that a dangerous health condition
exists.27
While suits based upon breach of the implied warranty of
habitability or strict liability were suggested as providing the best chance
for recovery by homeowners suing for radon-induced damages, suits
based upon negligence and fraud were also seen as viable in particular
circumstances.
3. Negligence
Most commentators suggested that a lawsuit against the builder,
architect or real estate broker" for indoor radon contamination
grounded upon a common law negligence theory might be viable.
273
However, few thought that this approach superior to the warranty of
habitability or strict liability avenues. 4  The negligence theory with
regard to a builder, for example, requires that the homeowner prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the defendant owed a duty to
the homeowner to use reasonable care in building the residence; (2) the
defendant breached the duty; and (3) the homeowner was injured and
270. See id. at 711; see supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 71-107.
272. See Waltz, supra note 10, at 1144-46 for a detailed discussion of potential
liability of real estate brokers with regard to the radon issue.
273. See, e.g., Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 719-22; Shuko, supra note 22, at
370-76; Conaway, supra note 10, at 38-43.
274. See, e.g., Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 719-22; Shuko, supra note 22, at
370-76. One commentator noted:
Many difficulties arise in proving an existing duty on the part of the contractor
or architect, a breach of this duty, and causation. Therefore, although probably
more viable than strict product liability; a negligence theory is often not the
best remedy to pursue in the event of radon contamination in the home.
However, as the industry becomes more aware of the radon hazard, this theory
will become more appropriate because the duties of builders will become more
clearly defined.
Dearing, supra note 8, at 840.
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suffered damages as a proximate result of the breach."'
With regard to the first element, the law of negligence imposes
a duty of care upon the builder if a reasonable person similarly situated
would have anticipated that harm or injury was likely to occur."
Thus, the builder in the negligence action potentially will be liable if the
defendant knew or should have known that the home was constructed in
a manner permitting radon contamination. Clearly, the state of
knowledge with regard to the radon hazard will be relevant to this
determination.2"
If the plaintiff can establish a duty, the plaintiff will then have to
prove that the builder breached the duty by not exercising the care and
skill of an ordinary builder under like circumstances.278 The plaintiff
might argue not only that deficiencies existed in construction, but also
might contend that the location of the construction in a radon prone area
breached the duty of care.2"9
Although the plaintiffs ability to bear the burden of proving the
first two elements of the negligence claim will be challenging, proving
that the breached duty proximately caused injury or damages to the
plaintiff may be the most difficult. With regard to the radon issue, there
remains much to learn about the degree and duration of exposure which
causes injury, if injury is caused at all.28 Most commentators agreed
that, until more is learned about the dangers of indoor radon, a
negligence-based lawsuit "is not the best option available to the
homeowner injured as a result of radon contamination." 2 1
4. Fraud
Common law fraud or deceit actions require the plaintiff to
establish five elements: (1) a false representation of a material fact by
275. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 266, § 30.
276. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 265, §§ 289, 298.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 74-110 (discussing the state of knowledge).
278. See, e.g., Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp, 586 F. Supp. 14 (D. Colo. 1984). For
a discussion of the "reasonable person" standard, see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
266, § 32.
279. See Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 720.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 74-111; Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at
724-35 (detailing the health-related damages that may be associated with a radon
claim).
281. Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 721.
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the defendant; (2) knowledge or belief by the defendant that the
representation was false (or lack of sufficient information upon which to
base such a statement); (3) intent to induce the plaintiff to rely on the
false representation; (4) justifiable reliance on the representation by the
plaintiff; and (5) damage to the plaintiff as a result of reliance.2 2
Clearly, the builder, seller and real estate broker who are aware of a
radon condition in the home are under a duty to disclose this information
to the potential buyer.23
As in all suits for fraud, one of the most difficult burdens for the
plaintiff, however, is proving knowledge on the part of the defendant.
Proving that the defendant knew of the degree of radon contamination
may be particularly difficult.2 Consequently, the court may hold the
defendant liable for negligent misrepresentation, which relieves the
plaintiff from having to prove that the defendant made the
misrepresentation with the intent to deceive or with knowledge of the
statement's falsity.285 Even a statement made with an honest belief in
its truthfulness can, nonetheless, be the basis for a claim of negligent
misrepresentation. 286  Thus, if any defendant makes a statement
concerning radon, that defendant can be held accountable for its
truthfulness.287 In cases in which the defendants have uttered no
statements about radon, proving fraud may depend on whether the silence
of the defendants can be viewed as a false representation.2 8 Generally,
with regard to real estate sales, silence as to latent defects of which the
defendant has actual knowledge or which are reasonably discoverable by
the defendant will constitute fraud.289
Knowledge of the possibility of indoor radon contamination has
282. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 266, § 105, at 728.
283. See, e.g., Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204-05 (1963) (where seller
knows facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property and the facts
are only accessible to him, and where the facts are not known to or within the reach
of the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose); Reed v. King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130,
131-33 (1983) (seller knew that home was the site of multiple murder and was under
a duty to disclose that fact to the buyer).
284. See Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 722.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 723.
289. Id.; see generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 266, § 106, at 73640
(discussing duty to disclose).
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only come about recently.29° For sales of homes which occurred more
than a decade ago, one could not expect disclosure of a yet unknown
defect. However, with regard to real estate sales since the information
explosion following the discovery at the Watras house, one commentator
noted: "At a minimum, as knowledge of radon and its effects on
residential real estate grows, the builder, seller, and real estate broker of
homes in radon-prone areas must be expected both to determine if a
radon problem exists and to disclose that problem to potential
purchasers.0 91
5. Violation of Constitutional Right to Privacy
Finally, some commentators suggest that the courts may become
involved in the determination of constitutional privacy issues with regard
to radon testing and mitigation efforts. More specifically, states,
particularly those which are establishing or have established operational
programs with regard to radon, 2' have the need to assess the extent of
radon contamination within their borders. For example, New Jersey, as
part of its data gathering activities, statutorily requires that certified radon
testers and mitigators disclose certain facts regarding work they perform
to specified state agencies. In particular, such contractors must disclose
the names of the owners of the real estate at which they perform work,
the address at which the work was done and the results of any tests.293
Although the statute does not provide for such information to be made
a matter of public record,294 it is not clear from the law whether
interested persons can request and receive such information.29 The
concern among property owners is that the release of such information
to the public would have a deleterious impact on the property's market
value.296 Moreover, the fear that such disclosure to interested persons
might be ordered by the court could dissuade homeowners from testing.
290. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
291. Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 723.
292. See supra notes 214-29 and accompanying text.
293. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2D-74 (West 1987).
294. Id. § 26:2D-78.
295. See Bannworth, supra note 8, at 185.
296. Cf N.J. STAT. ANN. 26:2D-73. New Jersey requires that in the case of a
prospective sale of a property which has been tested for radon, the seller must provide
the buyer, at the time the contract of sale is entered into, with the results of the test and
evidence of any subsequent mitigation. Id.
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6. Measure of Damages
Commentators also speculated about the measure of damages
which plaintiffs would be able to successfully establish.' g  Clearly,
plaintiffs would seek health-related damages, property-related damages
or both. 9  Due to the considerable degree of speculation which
remained concerning the health risks associated with the indoor radon
problem '" as well as the long latency period of up to thirty years
before manifestation of radon-induced lung cancer,3"' health-related
damages were viewed as much more tenuous than those related to the
property.
°30
Although numerous commentators responded to the discovery of
indoor radon with discussions of the legal issues which they anticipated
to be the basis of the predicted litigation explosion, 3° and although that
explosion did not materialize during radon's first decade as one of the
nation's most serious public health issues,03 the commentators'
analyses helped to bring into focus not only the issues which would
likely arise during the course of litigation, but also the issues which
remain disturbingly unknown about the naturally occurring phenomenon.
Before the public will take seriously the alleged health risks associated
with indoor radon and evidence their concern through the redress of
grievances in the court room, and even more importantly, through the
testing and mitigation of radon in their homes, more concrete scientific
evidence of indoor radon's dangers must be developed.
C. Radon and the Public
The failure of the forecasted litigation surge involving indoor
radon during the last ten years is perhaps the only positive aspect of an
otherwise confusing, tumultuous decade in which the American public
tried to come to terms with the odorless, colorless, tasteless, otherwise
297. See Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 724.
298. Id. at 724-38.
299. See supra notes 74-111 and accompanying text.
300. See Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 724 n.259.
301. Id. at 735. 1
302. See Sherman, supra note 7 ("Radon, the naturally occurring gas seeping up into
New Jersey's houses, can explode into litigation for almost anyone connected to real
estate, environmental law specialists warn.").
303. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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invisible killer said to lurk within our most intimate environs: our
homes. The lack of cases filed with the courts during the last ten years
can surely be attributed to apathy,3" 4 particularly during the later years
of the decade. Notwithstanding the apparent apathetic'response of the
public to the radon issue, it may be too simplistic to attribute the failure
of the radon issue to swamp our courtrooms merely to apathy. Other
factors clearly played a role.
As commentators began to forecast a litigation explosion, and
federal and state agencies began to engage in greater efforts to educate
the public with regard to radon, legal analysts and practitioners examined
ways to protect clients from being successfully sued over radon issues.
Because most commentators anticipated that potential litigation over
radon would likely occur pursuant to the sale or transfer of an interest in
real estate,305 analysts examined both disclaimers and inspection clauses
as means of avoiding liability.3°6 Commentators typically dismissed
the reliance upon generalized contract disclaimers or the "buyer takes as
is" type of clause, suggesting that such clauses are often found to be
against public policy.3" They did suggest, however, that disclaimers
that specifically reference radon and that are conspicuous and clearly
stated, would likely protect the seller.308
More frequently recommended, and evidently more successfully
employed,'" were the radon contingency clauses which are found in
contracts for the sale of real estate.310 In a typical radon contingency
clause the parties establish a standard, typically 4 pCi/l,3" above which
the seller agrees to take remedial action or potentially lose the sale.3"
For example, pursuant to the radon contingency clause, a test for radon
is made before the settlement on the property. If the test determines that
304. See TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT, supra note 175, at 6-1.
305. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 7, at 1; Prussman, supra note 10, at 717.
306. See, e.g., Waltz, supra note 10, at 1146-51; David Brooks, Radon Clauses Enter
House Contracts, N.J. L.J., Mar. 10, 1988, at 25.
307. See Waltz, supra note 10, at 1147-51. But see Cross & Murray, supra note 10,
at 718.
308. Id.
309. See Brooks, supra note 306.
310. See Shepherd & Gaynor, supra note 8, at 9.
311. "Contract clauses are generally tied to the identical federal and state guidelines
of 4 picocuries per liter, a reading above that level often forces the seller to get rid of
the gas, or allows the buyer out of the deal." Brooks, supra note 306, at 27.
312. See Shepherd & Gaynor, supra note 8, at 9.
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the radon level exceeds a predetermined level and if the estimated
remedial costs are less than a predetermined amount, the clause obligates
the seller to perform the work."' However, if the estimated remedial
costs exceed the predetermined amount, the seller can either credit the
buyer with the estimated costs to remedy or notify the buyer of the
seller's unwillingness to allow for the credit.3 4 The buyer, of course,
may waive the contingency and go ahead with the purchase anyway or
may void the contract.3"
These types of clauses were used with increasing frequency,
particularly in areas identified with high radon levels. 316 The use of the
contingency clauses clearly contributed to the failure of the litigation
explosion. For many buyers and sellers the radon contingency clause
became as standard as the clause for termite infestation and urea
formaldehyde insulation.3 7  Furthermore, even when radon was
discovered, one commentator noted, "the detection of radon has caused
few [real estate] deals to fall through, even though prolonged exposure
to high concentrations of the gas is believed to cause cancer." 318 Also,
even though tampering with the radon testing devices by sellers,
particularly the short-term devices typically used in real estate
transactions, 3 1 was recognized as a very real possibility, 320 there are,
nonetheless, virtually no reported cases of fraud involving the issue of
test tampering.
Although the suggestion that the vjse of radon contingency clauses
in contracts helped to avert a litigation explosion cannot be gainsaid, it
too cannot entirely explain the failure of the issue to catch fire.
Considering that radon contamination in the home is claimed to cause
significant life threatening risks, the fact that there has not been greater
evidence of public concern manifested through the form of litigation on
the issue is surprising. Many commentators have noted that the latency
period of twenty years or more for the development of radon-induced
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. See Shepherd, supra note 22, at 45; Brooks, supra note 306, at 27.
317. See Brooks, supra note 306, at 27.
318. Id. at 25.
319. See Shepherd, supra note 22, at 48.
320. Id. "Some officials believe that between 25 and 40 percent [sic] of all residential
real estate radon tests involve tampering." Id.
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lung cancer321 is an impediment to plaintiffs in recovering health-
related damages in radon litigation. 22  However, property-related
damages, such as compensation for remediation of radon or diminution
in market value, are not a function of the latency period. 3 Yet very
few of these cases have been brought in the last ten years.324 The
obvious lack of public interest in the issue caused commentators to
speculate as to the reasons why the radon scare faded so quickly. One
commentator noted:
Whatever happened to the radon scare?
Two years ago this month, the Environmental Protection
Agency recommended that all homes be tested for the colorless,
tasteless gas that is blamed for at least 20,000 lung-cancer deaths
each year.
The message created a brief flurry of testing activity
among homeowners and then was quickly forgotten. 25
As previously discussed, EPA must assume much of the
responsibility for the lack of public interest in the radon issue. 26
EPA's overly simplistic, somewhat arbitrary action level for testing and
mitigation led to much criticism and controversy.3 27  Even EPA was
forced to admit that its initial estimates of radon-induced deaths were
probably overblown.3 2' At the same time, Congress was ordering EPA
to rewrite A CIZEN'S GuIDE to correct, among other things, the
perception that a 4 pCi/l radon level was the threshold between safe and
unsafe radon levels.3 29  Furthermore, EPA failed to properly educate
321. See Cross & Murray, supra note 10, at 724.
322. Eg., Id. at 724.
323. Id. at 735-38.
324. See Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 357 & n.192 (citing residential radon cases filed
as of 1988). Litigation in this field also involves actions by vendors against purchasers.
After a discovery of residential radon contamination, purchasers who default on
purchase agreements may be held liable to the vendor for damages. See, e.g., Wong
v. Mercado, 590 A.2d 723 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (holding purchaser liable
because default was based on a radon level of 2.9 pCi/I was objectively unreasonable).
325. Gene Austin, Has Homeowners' Radon Scare Gone With The Wind?, PHILA
INQUIRER, Sept. 30, 1990, at I-L.
326. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 75-117 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 101-13 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
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the public about the fact that radon levels can vary from one home to the
other. According to one EPA official, "'If someone tests in a
neighborhood and gets a low reading, everybody says, 'There's no radon
here, so why bother.' If someone gets a high reading, the others don't
want to hear about it."'33 Obviously, the public was, and remains,
simply confused about the dangers of radon.
In the final analysis, however, it does appear that apathy played
the most significant role in the failure of the radon issue to move the
public. One commentator suggested a compelling argument that the
public's apathy is due in part to the characteristics of radon:
1. Radon poses a "life-style" risk -- similar to that posed
by smoking cigarettes or drinking alcohol -- and people
tend to underestimate, deny, or dismiss life-style risks.
2. The objective probability of getting lung cancer from
radon -- between one and five percent if exposure is four
picocuries per liter ... -- is too low for people to
understand the risk and respond appropriately.
3. Radon -- colorless, odorless, and tasteless -- presents
no perceptual reminders to alert people to its presence; its
physical characteristics do not trigger self-protective
behavior.
4. Because radon poses a natural risk, rather than a risk
created by man or technology, there is no "villain" to
blame or to make responsible. Moreover, people tend to
underestimate, dismiss, or deny natural risks and treat
them less seriously than man-made risks.
5. Homeowners' experience with radon generally is
benign, many having long lived with it in their homes
without negative ramifications.
6. Radon-induced lung cancer has a long latency period
and displays no early warning symptoms. Because it takes
so long for radon to cause cancer, homeowners do not
330. Austin, supra note 325.
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perceive it as a serious threat.
7. Exposure to radon does not cause mass death or
disaster; deaths occur singly. Also, there is no obvious
perceptual link between exposure and death.
8. People, who choose their homes, voluntarily expose
themselves to radon (and, before 1986, information about
radon to consider when choosing homes was hard to
obtain).
9. Radon risk is not the same for everyone; it varies
depending on such factors as soil type, house structure,
and behavior of home occupants.
331
The public's failure to initiate radon-related litigation during the
last ten years is a positive note for an already litigious society. However,
it also supports the proposition that the public simply does not take the
indoor radon threat seriously. The characteristics of radon contamination
as well as the bungled message concerning radon from governmental
sources both have contributed to the public passiveness with regard to the
issue during the past decade. If radon truly is the life-threatening
phenomenon as the great weight of scientific evidence suggests, then new
approaches to reach the public about the seriousness of the radon
problem must be proposed, examined and implemented.
III. THE RADON PROBLEM IN THE FUTURE
Most commentators who have addressed the residential radon
problem since 1988 recognized that a passive governmental approach,
either on the federal level or state level, would not adequately protect the
public.3" Some commentators suggested that EPA should continue to
coordinate information about radon, disseminate that information to the
states, research testing and remedial techniques and recommend standards
for new construction333  These commentators also saw the need for
331. Locke, supra note 10, at 10,476-77 (footnotes omitted).
332. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 8, at 60-61; Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 354-80;
Locke, supra note 10, at 10,478-82.
333. See-Moore, supra note 8, at 59-60.
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some efforts at regulating the radon problem through legislation.334
One commentator called for the federal government to draft
"legislation mandating states to develop radon programs that will
adequately address the problem within the state." '335 The recommended
legislation would employ EPA to set standards which the states would
achieve by developing their own programs. States, however, would not
be required to guarantee that every building met EPA's standard."
Essentially, this commentator appears to be suggesting that the federal
government should at least insist that every state show some evidence
that it takes the radon problem seriously by establishing an operational
state radon program. 37
Similarly, other commentators suggested government intervention,
but on a much more intrusive level. For example, one commentator
suggested that Congress enact legislation authorizing EPA to promulgate
regulations requiring the states to comply with its 4 pCi/l guideline.33
She argued that allowing homeowners to decide for themselves whether
to improve their own indoor air quality339 and providing common law
remedies to compensate for injury related to indoor radon
contamination 340 are both insufficient means to protect the public. To
respond to these problems, she called for federal legislation mandating
state enforcement of a 4 pCi/l standard.34m Coinciding with the federal
legislation, the commentator called for mandatory testing legislation at
the state level: "A state mandatory testing regulation could require, for
instance, that all homeowners within the state test for radon
annually."341 Other commentators also supported mandatory testing on
the state level. 43 Some appeared to call for mandatory remediation as
well: "If seat belts and smoking restrictions are now accepted by the
public, the time for mandatory radon testing and remediation, at least for
334. Id.; Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 354-80; Locke, supra note 10, at 10,478-82;
Marsha Wolf & Lewis Goldshore, New Radon Bill Reflects Change In Approach, N.J.
L.J., Nov. 2, 1989, at 9.
335. Moore, supra note 8, at 60.
336. Id.
337. See generally supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text.
338. See Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 359.
339. Id. at 354-58.
340. See id at 357-58.
341. Id. at 359.
342. Id. at 370.
343. See, e.g., Bannworh supra note 8, at 192.
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public buildings and on sale of private residences, is drawing closer.""
In light of the EPA's dogged adherence to its advisory posture
with regard to the radon issue during the last ten years, it seems highly
unlikely that the agency would support mandatory testing. It is also
important to note that mandatory testing necessarily implies mandatory
remediation. That the federal government would insist that a homeowner
test to discover a radon problem and yet permit the problem to go
unabated at the whim of the owner seems incongruous. The same
problem clearly exists at the state level.
Moreover, if the government, either federal or state, is going to
mandate testing and remediation, then it must be prepared to shoulder at
least some of the expense. Even financial assistance to remediate in the
form of low interest loans, tax credits, subsidized remediation service and
grants to low income homeowners34 would surely overburden the
already financially strapped governmental budgets.
With ten years having passed since the discovery of naturally
occurring indoor radon contamination at the Watras house, too many
uncertainties remain involving radon risks for federal and state
governments to seek to implement mandatory testing in the near
future.3" Before the government can entertain any efforts to force
people to test it must provide evidence to support the risks at given
levels of exposure with definitive scientific studies. Although few would
argue against abatement of high levels of indoor radon, the health risk at
levels around EPA's 4 pCi/l action level remain too tenuous to insist
upon mandatory remediation. The EPA should continue to inform
homeowners of its current thinking with regard to the action level and
urge citizens to mitigate; but, at this time, mandatory testing and
remediation are simply too intrusive, 47 difficult to monitor and
enforce34 and expensive.34 9
If the government wishes to address the radon issue in a more
regulatory manner, then it should consider a proposal to achieve its goal
through a more indirect and less obtrusive manner. One commentator
344. Wolf & Goldshore, supra note 334.
345. See Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 372.
346. See supra notes 75-116 and accompanying text.
347. See Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 360 n.207.
348. Id. at 370.
349. Id.
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offered a solution which recognized a pattern of behavior which has
occurred during the past ten years with regard to testing and mitigating
indoor radon. Because studies have shown that during the last ten years
most of the testing for and mitigation of radon have occurred pursuant
to the sale of real estate, the commentator proposed a federal law which
would tie testing and remediation to the financing of real estate
purchases.35  Citing a study that indicated that home buyers are a
population which appears to take radon hazards more seriously than
others, as evidenced by their perseverance through the testing and
mitigation processes, 5 ' the commentator proposed a two-part national
strategy which ties the testing for radon to the purchase of real
estate.52 The commentator specifically suggested (1) that Congress
enact legislation which mandates the provision of radon information to
the mortgagor for every federally related mortgage loan originated by
mortgage granting institutions and (2) that radon test results be included
in every federally related mortgage loan purchased, swapped, handled or
otherwise acquired by federal or quasi-federal governmental
organizations that participate in the secondary mortgage market. 3
The efficacy of providing radon information at the time of the
buyer's application for financing 354 is grounded on the fact that all
parties to the process -- the buyer, the seller and the lending institution -
- have an interest in seeing that the home is marketable. 3'5 Unabated
radon contamination clearly affects the value of the real estate. Because
federally related loans encompass most of the mortgages issued to
purchase residential real estate,3 6 a high likelihood exists that most
buyers will be informed of the hazards of indoor radon.3" To ensure,
however, that buyers take seriously the warnings about radon contained
in the provided radon information, the second part of the proposal
350. See Locke, supra note 10, at 10,479-81.
351. Id. at 10,478-79.
352. Id. at 10,479-81.
353. Id.
354. The commentator suggested a law which would require all lenders of federally
related mortgage loans to distribute a booklet, prepared or approved by EPA, to
potential mortgagors. He suggested further that the booklet could be based on EPA's
two most widely disseminated radon pamphlets, A CIzEN's GUIDE and RADON
REDUCTION METHODS. Id. at 10,480.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. See id. at 10,481.
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requires that radon test results be contained in documents which
accompany the transaction in the secondary mortgage market."'
Because billions of dollars worth of mortgages are sold each year in the
governmental-based secondary mortgage market, most primary lenders
would insist upon radon tests of the subject property as a prerequisite to
making a loan commitment. '59
In support of this proposal, the commentator noted many
advantages to using the loan application process for educating the
homeowner about the dangers of radon. Principal among the cited
advantages are: (1) the proposal recognizes that buyers of real property
are inclined to take radon warnings seriously; (2) parties related to the
home-buying process, such as real estate agents and mortgage bankers,
will have access to radon information and will encourage buyers to take
the issue seriously; (3) radon testing and mitigation will become a
commonplace prerequisite to selling a home; (4) the program is cost-
effective for the federal government due to the fact that there are no
costly and burdensome regulatory and enforcement responsibilities; and
(5) the program creates uniformity among the states, thus avoiding a
piecemeal radon policy.'" The most significant drawback to the
proposal is that its scope is limited to the sale of homes. Because only
five percent of all homes are sold each year, its attack on the radon
problem is slow. 6' While the proposal utilizing the home
mortgage market is far more appealing than the more intrusive mandatory
testing and mitigation suggestions, it nonetheless perpetuates a reliance
on EPA's guidance regarding the radon levels deemed to be health risks.
Without further scientific evidence on the dangers of a 4 pCi/l reading,
for example, and without more reliable short-term testing devices,362
the burden of radon tests and mitigation efforts, as well as their attendant
expenses, will continue to be placed on parties to the sale of real estate
without a clear-cut justification.
As noted previously, the greater weight of scientific authority
358. Id. at 10,480-82.
359. Id. at 10,481.
360. See id. at 10,481-82.
361. Id. at 10,482.
362. One commentator noted, "Because time is of the essence in most real estate
transactions, few home buyers have the luxury of awaiting the results of a long-term
radon test. ... The most popular short-term screening device is the charcoal canister."
Shepherd, supra note 22, at 48.
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supports the concern about the dangers of indoor radon. 63 The public
should not ignore the warnings. On the other hand, EPA, while subject
to criticism, has changed its position on some important facts related to
the radon problem, such as the projected number of deaths caused by
radon-induced lung cancer 3" and the recommended treatment for a 4
pCi/l radon level. 65 Consequently, for the government, either federal
or state, to require testing or remediation is not appropriate at this time.
If further studies confirm indoor radon hazards with greater detail, then
governments should consider the possibility of regulation.
Scientific inquiry is an ongoing process and there appears to be
enough scientific evidence to suggest that the public should be apprised
of radon. Thus, buyers of real estate, particularly in those areas of the
country where radon is known to be a potential indoor hazard, should be
informed of the potential dangers of radon as well as the limitations on
testing and mitigating which have been gleaned during the course of the
last ten years. This can be accomplished primarily through the efforts of
sales agents who are already under a duty to inform prospective buyers
of a potential radon problem. 3" The buyer, however, should also be
apprised by the agent of the fact that short-term radon testing devices
have not yet been deemed sufficiently reliable to determine the extent of
an indoor radon problem and that short-term testing devices are too
easily manipulated by eager sellers. The buyer, therefore, should
routinely be urged by the real estate professional to take the opportunity
to perform a more reliable long-term test upon the transfer of the
363. See Jaffe, supra note 112.
364. In A CIzEN's GUIDE, EPA states, "Scientists estimate that from about 5,000
to about 20,000 lung cancer deaths a year in the United States may be attributed to
radon." A CITIzEN's GUIDE, supra note 3, at 1. In CrnzEN's GUIDE, 2D ED., EPA
notes that, "Radon is estimated to cause about 14,000 deaths per year -- however, this
number could range from 7,000 to 30,000 deaths per year." CITIZEN's GUIDE, 2D ED.,
supra note 194, at 2.
365. In A CrnzEN's GUIDE, EPA states that if a short-term screening measurement is
less than about 4 pCi/l "follow-up measurements are probably not required." A
CITIZEN'S GUIDE, supra note 3, at 7. In CITIZEN's GUIDE, 2D ED., EPA states: "A
short-term test followed by a second short-term test may be used to decide whether to
fix your home. However, the closer the average of your two short-term tests is to 4
pCi/l, the less certain you can be about whether your year-round average is above or
below that level. Keep in mind that radon levels below 4 pCi/l still pose some risk.
Radon levels can be reduced in most homes to 2 pCi/l or below." CITIZEN'S GUIDE, 2D
ED., supra note 194, at 14.
366. See Winicour, supra note 22, at 791 n.190.
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property.
Pursuant to the long-term test, the buyer should be urged to
consider requiring that the seller fund an escrow account upon which the
buyer could draw to mitigate a radon problem should the long-term test
result indicate a radon level of 4 pCi/l or greater. With regard to the
escrow account, the buyer should be informed that if at the end of the
buyer's first year of occupancy a long-term test has not been performed,
or if performed with a test result less than 4 pCi/l, the escrow money will
be returned to the seller. 67 The real estate agent should address these
issues in a writing given to and initialed by the buyer. The seller should
also be apprised that the sales agent is bound by law to provide the
potential buyer with all relevant information on radon. Of course,
because the establishment of the escrow account would remain a matter
of contract negotiation, the buyer may waive the right to require the
escrow account or the seller may refuse to agree to it.
The escrow account idea is not a perfect solution. However, it
does recognize that at the time of the sale of real estate people are most
receptive to information about radon.36' Moreover, it is likely to
encourage prospective sellers to test and mitigate in order to avoid the
possibility of having funds held in escrow for a year. Equally important,
because it requires no governmental intervention beyond the research and
publication efforts already underway, it is cost effective. Furthermore,
it places the duty to inform of the potential radon hazard in the
geographic location on those who would or should know best about its
likelihood: real estate agents. The law is now clear that real estate
brokers must inform potential customers about the condition of homes
and that brokers may be held liable for failing to inform buyers about
known defects that could injure persons or property or about factors that
materially affect the value of property.369 As one commentator noted:
"The real estate broker, who has greater knowledge about homes than do
owners or buyers and is hired to increase the efficiency of the real estate
transaction, appears to be best situated to ensure that prospective buyers
are provided with information." 370
367. This escrow account proposal has been favorably suggested by a number of
commentators. See, e.g., Jackowitz, supra note 3, at 376-77; Sherman, supra note 7,
at 24.
368. See Locke, supra note 10, at 10,478.
369. See Note, Imposing Tort Liability On Real Estate Brokers Selling Defective
Housing, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1861, 1862-65 (1986).
370. Id. at 1867-68 (footnotes omitted).
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Although the escrow account suggestion labors under the same
shortcomings as the mortgage-based regulatory scheme 371 to the extent
that it is limited to the sales of homes3 72 and is a slow process for
correction of a potentially large indoor radon contamination problem,
373
it is perhaps the best alternative for handling the problem as we enter the
second decade of dealing with the indoor pollutant. It recognizes that
radon is most likely a serious health threat and at the same time informs
the homeowner of the limitations that still exist with regard to our
understanding of the hazards. The homeowner, whether buyer or seller,
is not required to correct a condition which is still under investigation by
the scientific community, yet is afforded the opportunity to receive the
most current thinking of the scientific community with regard to the issue
as set forth in governmental publications. Furthermore, although the
escrow account option encourages the homeowner to test and remedy, it
nonetheless retains a freedom to act on the part of buyers and sellers
which respects their right to interpret information about a risk that is still
uncertain.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since the discovery of high levels of naturally occurring indoor
radon at the Watras house in Boyertown, Pennsylvania, in December
1984, the American public has been bombarded with a variety of
allegations about the effects of the indoor gas. After a study by EPA,
the federal agency announced in 1988 that indoor radon from naturally
occurring sources was the nation's most serious air pollution problem.
EPA claimed that indoor radon was responsible for 20,000 deaths each
year and urged every homeowner to test for radon. Following EPA's
announcement, worried homeowners sought out testing devices and
began to engage contractors to correct indoor radon problems. While
EPA suggested that radon test results above 4 pCi/l were dangerously
high and needed to be reduced, this action level came to be regarded as
the threshold point between safe and unsafe household levels of radon.
As the 4 pCi/l value became firmly entrenched in the minds of the
371. See supra notes 364-65 and accompanying text.
372. See Locke, supra note 10, at 10,482 (tying radon testing to real estate sales is
limiting because "it does not address other dwelling units, such as apartment rental
units or schools and public buildings").
373. Id.
RESIDENTIAL RADON CONTAMINATION
public, most typically through real estate transactions, critics emerged
challenging the data EPA utilized to establish the guideline. Moreover,
common radon testing devices came under scrutiny and were often found
to be unreliable. In addition, EPA's protocol for testing came under
attack as critics charged that radon entry into the home was a function
of many variables, some of which EPA apparently had not recognized.
While EPA attempted to maintain an advisory posture with regard to
indoor radon, some critics in Congress charged that the EPA was not
doing enough to educate the public about the dangers. Finally, some
charged that EPA had mislead the public with the 4 pCi/l guideline
because even that level was unsafe..
Just two years after the federal government's stem warning about
the dangers of indoor radon, the public all but ignored the issue. EPA's
credibility with regard to the radon issue was damaged. Its efforts to
inform the public without creating a panic resulted instead in complete
apathy. Forecasted explosions in litigation concerning radon issues never
materialized and calls for comprehensive regulatory policy went
unheeded. Since the discovery of dangerously high levels of radon at the
Watras house ten years ago, the radon issue today appears virtually dead.
Although the scientific community generally agrees with the
federal government about the dangers of indoor radon, the necessity for
further research substantiating the health hazards of indoor radon
remains. Consequently, EPA and other governmental bodies must not
yet seek regulatory control over the homeowners' response to the
problem in order to prevent further erosion of the public's concern about
the indoor pollutant. There simply are too many unanswered questions
remaining with regard to almost all areas of the radon issue.
Rather, EPA should continue its efforts to research the radon
phenomenon in order to support more thoroughly and convincingly its
position on the health risks. At the same time, EPA should take steps to
increase citizen awareness of the radon issue. Because there apparently
is sufficient scientific support to warn the public about higher levels of
radon and because the public appears most receptive to grappling with
radon issues during the sale of real estate, real estate professionals should
be the conduit for informing the buying public about the necessity to
consider radon issues when purchasing a home. Although such efforts
reach only a fraction of the homes that the government estimates are in
need of radon mitigation, the government is not yet in the position to
advocate a greater intrusion into the homes of the American people.
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